# 1NC

## 1NC — Off

### 1NC — CP

#### The United States federal government should create a new regulatory agency called the Department of Food which will review and condition all anticompetitive mergers, acquisitions, and undemocratic cooperative governance in the agricultural sector on companies and cooperatives committing to provide substantial resources to the domestic and international development of sustainable agriculture practices that shift away from industrial agriculture including substantial reductions in use of chemicals and pesticides, pursuit of cooperative procompetitive research and development collaboration with small farms and cooperatives, promotion of crop diversity and ending of monocropping, the preservation of genetic diversity, the lowering of commodity prices and the communal sharing of agricultural technologies and resources globally. The Department of Food will deny licenses to operate in United States markets for noncompliance of merger or acquisition conditions.

#### That solves best — resource constraints mean sustainable practices are impossible when you limit monopolies

Carlisle et al 19, Environmental Studies Program, University of California, Santa Barbara, Liz, Transitioning to Sustainable Agriculture Requires Growing and Sustaining an Ecologically Skilled Workforce, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2019.00096/full#B35

Barriers to Becoming a Sustainable Farmer The first step toward growing an agroecologically-skilled workforce involves reducing the initial barriers to entry into farming, which may be even more challenging for farmers hoping to embrace such practices. One of the biggest barriers faced by would-be farmers is acquiring or gaining access to land, particularly land with adequate access to water. As development pressures and policies favor “productive” purposes like housing and infrastructure, national farmland acreage nationwide has decreased, often irreversibly. A recent report on farmland loss estimates a reduction of 31 million acres between 1992 and 2012 (American Farmland Trust, 2018), with African American and Native American farmers disproportionately affected by land loss (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014; Newkirk, 2019). In California alone, 1.4 million acres of farm and grazing land were lost between 1984 and 2014, a decrease of about 50,000 acres per year (California Department of Conservation, 2019). That trend appears to be accelerating still further: according to the new USDA Agricultural Census, between 2012 and 2017, California land in farms declined by an average of 209,240 acres per year. In parallel—and perhaps as a result—remaining US farmland has steadily increased in value, with croplands doubling in appreciation in the 2004–2014 period (USDA NASS, 2017). The aging farm population would appear to present an opportunity for new farmers (including farm workers) to buy out retirees, but without robust land use policies, much of this farmland is instead being transferred to institutional investors, which means new farmers are more likely to be tenants than farmland owners (Calo and De Master, 2016). As tenants, farmers have less autonomy to make long-term management decisions—decisions which may pose a relatively greater challenge for farmers interested in pursuing agroecology. For example, tenant farmers may not be in a position to invest in perennial crops, conservation infrastructure, or soil health (Calo and De Master, 2016). Land is not the only major asset for which new farmers require staggering amounts of up-front capital: equipment, operating costs, and proper storage and post-handling facilities can require millions of dollars before farmers harvest their first crop (Schiller, 2017). These costs may be even higher for biologically diversified farms, as they tend to require more diverse and appropriately scaled equipment that may be used only at certain times of the year or only for specific crops. These farms also need to make upfront investments in soil health and ecosystem function, such as soil-building cover crops, compost applications, and hedgerows. Over time, these investments can reduce input costs and production risk, while boosting fertility, carbon sequestration potential, and drought resilience. But their economic benefits may not be realized for years, while farmers can face initial production risks from switching to new practices. Moreover, new farmers have few options for financing such investments without incurring significant debt, and new farmers using ecologically-informed management are particularly poorly served by federal crop insurance subsidies, half of which go to farms in the top 10% of crop sales (Belasco, 2017) and many of which undervalue or even deter sustainable farming practices (Woodard and Verteramo-Chiu, 2017).

#### Only mergers can create the resource base for sustainable agriculture and the sharing of knowledge and technology — they need to be turned in the right direction

Guernsey 17, a partner in family farming operation and Chief Executive Officer of a Healthcare & Medical Equipment Non-Profit Organization in Kansas City and former State Rep in Missouri. (Casey, Combined Strengths of Merged Bayer, Monsanto Will Help World Meet Formidable Challenge – Feeding 10 Billion People, https://themissouritimes.com/combined-strengths-merged-bayer-monsanto-will-help-world-meet-formidable-challenge-feeding-10-billion-people/)

Our world faces many daunting challenges in the decades ahead, with perhaps the most basic being how to feed a growing population even as our living space consumes more and more of the land where our food is produced. We must increase agricultural productivity by 60 percent to feed the approximately 10 billion people expected to inhabit the Earth by 2050 (up from 7 billion right now) – even as the amount of farmland per capita decreases by 17 percent from today’s levels. The task is made more complex by the expected effects of climate change, which experts see decreasing farm yields by 17 percent over the same 33-year period. Tools to overcome these obstacles can be provided only by aggressive, well-managed research and development that improves the ways crops and farm animals are raised – not only the science of agriculture, but the ways technology and masses of data can be applied to help farmers use that science at the right time and in the best ways to generate results. The world’s numerous companies and research institutions devoted to advancing agricultural science must reinvigorate and unify their efforts to provide humans with more nutritious food, in a sustainable way, using less land. The proposed merger of Germany-based Bayer and America’s Monsanto provides one vehicle for creating the research and development base we need for global agriculture. The two companies already are leaders across a broad span of agricultural R&D, responsible for thousands of products that have revolutionized agriculture over recent decades. And they are leading the way toward greater integration of technology into farm management. Their combined R&D portfolio – an astounding EUR 2.5 billion annual endeavor – will have exceptional depth and reach, with enormous commercial potential. Between them, the merged companies have 10,000 research and development professionals working around the globe at more than 40 R&D facilities, and at 200 breeding stations devoted to improving not only the yields from farm animals but also the health of those animals. (Overall, Bayer has almost 117,000 employees worldwide, including 12,000 in the U.S., while Monsanto has about 20,000 workers.) Today, both Bayer and Monsanto are moving ahead with strong product development efforts that promise to pay off for farmers and consumers in the short, medium, and long terms. Merging the two companies – an event targeted for the end of this year – will help make sure all of these efforts stay on track while also assuring that the combined operation can fully explore new opportunities to build more efficient, sustainable agriculture. Together, their innovation will give the world more choices and quality, and greater food security. Whenever a merger of major companies is discussed, the question is inevitable – will people lose jobs as a result? This transaction, I am confident after looking into the details, is focused heavily on driving innovation, growth, and investment rather than cutting costs. When you look at their structures, Bayer and Monsanto have many complimentary operations and few overlaps. While it is never safe to say, “There will be no job losses,” both companies are expected to maintain major sites that already operate in the U.S. and Germany. For instance, the combined agricultural business will have its Seeds & Traits operation, and its North American headquarters, in Monsanto’s hometown of St. Louis – and there will be key facilities in Durham, NC, as well as several other locations across America. San Francisco, meanwhile, will host the combined companies’ digital farming activities – a key business sector in the years ahead, as we create new opportunities for farmers worldwide to leverage data in better management of their crops and risks. While the new parent company will be based in Germany, the benefits of this merger for the U.S. are many and deep. America’s strong farming community will be at the heart of the global drive to keep food production abreast of both domestic and global needs. The combined talents and energies of Bayer and Monsanto will give American farmers the tools they need to feed the world. Monsanto’s 115-year history as an innovator and good corporate citizen will not be erased, but rather enhanced as it becomes one with 150-year-old Bayer – another global corporate citizen long familiar to Americans. Feeding a growing world – and feeding it better – requires new thinking, new tools, and a new commitment to hard work and partnerships. The combined forces of Bayer and Monsanto will lead the way toward to better-nourished humanity, and help all of us take better care of the land and animals that provide our nourishment.

#### Mergers say yes — Monsanto is willing

Hardcastle 16, has worked as a writer and editor at newspapers, magazines and online publications for more than a decade covering business, green technology, renewable energy and other environmental issues. She has written for Energy Manager Today, Solar Novus Today, Novus Light Technologies Today and Silicon Valley Business Journal. (Jessica, Bayer-Monsanto Deal: What Does It Mean for Sustainable Agriculture?, https://www.environmentalleader.com/2016/09/bayer-monsanto-deal-what-does-it-mean-for-sustainable-agriculture/)

Monsanto is also part of a newly formed partnership that aims to help farmers improve their bottom line while conserving natural resources through sustainable agriculture practices. Other founding members include major food and agriculture companies such as Cargill, General Mills, Kellogg, PepsiCo and Walmart. Indeed, Monsanto has made several very public pledges and partnerships confirming its commitment to sustainable agriculture. In 2013 the agribusiness company partnered with biochemical firm Novozymes to launch the BioAg Alliance, which aims to improve crop harvests through naturally occurring microbes such as bacteria and fungi. And late last year Monsanto said it will make its operations carbon neutral by 2021 by working with farmers to cut emissions and a program targeted across its seed and crop protection operations. Still, Monsanto hasn’t been able to make its sustainability-cred stick. The California EPA says the main ingredient in Monsanto’s chemical pesticide brand Roundup causes cancer and France and other European countries have banned the sale of Roundup, citing human health and environmental concerns. And while the jury is still out as to whether genetically modified crops will save — or destroy — sustainable agriculture, many environmentalists don’t like GMOs and they really don’t like the fact that they make up a big part of Monsanto’s business. This merger could help change Monsanto’s image, says Lux Research analyst Laura Lee. “This might be a chance for Monsanto to rebrand itself,” she said in an interview. “Monsanto has made several attempts to promote sustainable agriculture and they are public about their pledge to make their operations carbon neutral by 2021. But many of these pledges about sustainable farming fall on deaf ears. Monsanto has been the company that gets the negative target on their back.” Lee says Bayer’s pharmaceutical background — and it being a trusted household brand — may rub off on Monsanto. “If this acquisition goes through, it may be a chance for Monsanto to become a more trusted company to its pledges like conservation ag and carbon neutrality may have more gusto,” she said.

#### That’s key to solve zoonotic diseases — the aff makes them and land destruction inevitable

Alex Smith 20, Food and Agriculture Analyst at the Breakthrough Institute, MA/MSc in International and World History from Columbia University and the London School of Economics and Political Science, “To Combat Pandemics, Intensify Agriculture”, The Breakthrough Institute, 4/13/2020, https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/food/zoonosis

There is broad agreement in the epidemiological and virological studies of zoonoses that the most important factor in the development of new zoonotic diseases is land-use change. The development of wild lands, whether caused by agricultural extensification, mining, or other factors, simultaneously shrinks the habitat of wildlife and brings that wildlife in close proximity to human settlements. The combination of shrinking habitats, human-wildlife interactions, and food insecurity is a recipe for zoonosis. In West Africa, these three factors combined were responsible for HIV/AIDS and the slew of recent Ebola outbreaks.

Even when food insecurity and the consumption of wildlife are taken out of the equation, land-use change is a powerful driver of zoonotic disease, and has resulted in outbreaks of zoonotic diseases like malaria, yellow fever, dengue fever, Nipah virus, West Nile virus, Zika virus, and Lyme disease. Often, these diseases are transmitted from animals to humans through an intermediary, sometimes an insect (mosquitoes or ticks) and sometimes through livestock that live too close to wildlife populations, as was the case with Nipah.

Because the biggest driver of land-use change is agriculture, “intensive” high-yield agriculture often takes the blame, but the alternative — extensive, low-yield farming — would be worse. To prevent further pandemics, we must do as much as we can to stop land-use change while improving food security. We must, in other words, improve agricultural yields, allowing us to grow more food on less land. So, contrary to what many have asserted, a vital lever for limiting land-use change and providing cheap food for all is not to abandon intensive agriculture, but to intensify it further, especially in the developing world where food insecurity is greatest and where growing populations means rising food demand.

It is thanks to rising yields that farmers, globally, produce about three times the amount of crops while only using 13% more land than in 1950. For example, if yields from cereal production hadn’t increased since 1961, the global agricultural footprint would be 24% larger than it is today — increasing from roughly 50% at current levels to 62% of total habitable land — and would likely have resulted in even deadlier zoonotic outbreaks.

#### Extinction---defense is wrong

Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

### 1NC — T

#### Only per se illegality is a prohibition.

**Seita and Tamura 94** (Alex Y. Seita, Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University. B.S. 1973, California Institute of Technology; J.D. 1976, M.B.A. 1980, Stanford University, & Jiro Tamura, Associate Professor of Law, Keio University. B.A. 1981, M.A. 1983, Keio University; LL.M. 1985, Harvard University, [“The Historical Background of Japan's Antimonopoly Law,” 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 115, 177-178](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document/collection/analytical-materials/id/3S3T-WD60-00CW-508X-00000-00?page=177&reporter=8130&cite=1994%20U.%20Ill.%20L.%20Rev.%20115&context=1516831))

Upon the elimination of the restriction on undue substantial disparities in bargaining power, for example, economic concentration of power in and of itself was no longer a problem for business. The elimination of the prohibition against certain concerted activities meant that cartel behavior was no longer illegal per se. Most significantly, the authorization of depression and rationalization cartels under the Antimonopoly Law, with JFTC permission, legalized cartels under certain conditions. 418 Thus the rule of reason, rather than per se illegality, now governed cartel behavior. 419

#### The rule of reason is not a prohibition.

Skoczny 01 – Professor of law, Holder of the Jean Monnet Chair on European Economic Law at the Warsaw University Faculty of Management

Tadeusz Skoczny, “Polish Competition Law in the 1990s - on the Way to Higher Effectiveness and Deeper Conformity with EC Competition Rules,” European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 2, Issue 3-4, September 2001, LexisNexis

Most importantly, the new Act departed from the relativity of the prohibition of dominant position abuses; as in Article 82 EC Treaty, it is now a general prohibition which does not allow for exemptions on the basis of a rule of reason. Also new is the prohibition of the abuse of dominant position by groups of undertakings, which will allow to effectively control the state and the development of competition on oligopolistic markets. The Act also eliminated the distinction between monopolistic and dominant position; in theory and in practice, it was difficult to justify the maintenance of this distinction. Therefore, the Act relates only to a dominant position, the definition of which however has been changed. According to the new Article 4 point 9, dominant position means a position "which allows [the undertaking] to prevent effective competition on the relevant market thus enabling [the undertaking] to act to a significant degree independently from its competitors, contracting parties and consumers". It is easy to notice that this definition is based on the United Brands and Hoffmann La-Roche standards. It must nevertheless be emphasised that such understanding of dominance was introduced by the AMC already in 1993; it considered dominance as the capacity to act "to a large extent independently of the competitors and clients, thus also the consumers". Thanks to the AMC's judgements also the relevant product and geographical markets are defined on the basis of the criteria of "close commodity substitutability" and "homogenous competition conditions".

#### Their solvency advocate proves the violation — KU is blue

1AC Tam and Bielskis 21, Kristen, BA, Environmental Science Policy, University of California, Los Angeles, Olivia, BA, Political Science & Human Biology and Society, University of California, Los Angeles, "Stimulating Antitrust Enforcement to Expand the Regenerative Agriculture Movement," 2021-04-01, <https://escholarship.org/content/qt0m16g2r5/qt0m16g2r5.pdfAH>

The Supreme Court’s Ruling on Cargill v. Monfort Undermines the Clayton Act In response to the District and Circuit Court rulings, the Supreme Court’s first argument was that the showing of loss or damage merely due to increased competition does not constitute antitrust injury to seek relief under Section 16.77 The Supreme Court looked back to its rulings on Brunswick orp. V. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., where they held that “antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect small businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competition, but only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws.”78 Here, the Court found that the competition that Monfort alleged, competition for increased market share, was simply vigorous competition, and not actively forbidden by antitrust laws.79 The Court suggests that if antitrust laws protected competitors from the loss of profits due to this price competition, any decision by a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share would be rendered illegal.80 However, showing loss or damage due to increased competition does constitute antitrust injury. Antitrust injury results from predatory pricing, an anticompetitive practice forbidden by antitrust laws where a corporation intentionally lowers prices below normal competitive prices in order to monopolize part of the market.81 Monfort demonstrated that this injury is at play because they proved high likelihood that Excel would engage in a price-cost squeeze. A price cost squeeze may be viewed as “simply vigorous competition” in the short run. However, if the practice continues, it will greatly reduce competition in the long run. Furthermore, antitrust laws focus on protecting competition in the long run rather than treating these matters as mere short term price wars. In this case, the Court focused on the post-merger conduct and opted to deny relief unless the plaintiff could prove a violation of the Sherman Act. Instead, the Court should focus its attention on the merger itself and grant relief if there is a significant probability that the merger will adversely affect competition in the market, focusing on the probable threat of harm rather than actual harm.82 This aligns with the purpose of Section 7 in the Clayton Act to prevent mergers that “may substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly” without requiring initial proof of ongoing, established harm to the plaintiff.83

#### Vote neg---limits and ground---rule of reason exemptions zero topic DAs and explode the topic to any law review. Per se is the only shot at unique links.

### 1NC — K

#### The affirmative chooses to use the term “Third World” as a term to describe other countries. It is an explicit choice to use a term to describe what their Liotta evidence cites as cities in Africa and Asia as “less developed states” that are “unable or unwilling to manage challenges” with “inept or uncaring governments” and as “freakish national laboratories” as cites of lawlessness and poverty and “Petrie dishes of despair and danger”.

#### The use of the label “third world” is an act of colonial violence

Brown et al 20, (Kara, Associate Professor of Education University of South Carolina, with Payal Shah associate professor of Educational Studies at the University of South Carolina, and E. Doyle Stervick associate professor of Educational Leadership and Policies at the University of South Carolina, Labeling the World: The 3P Framework for Critiquing and Reconstructing Our Categorization Processes, Current Issues in Comparative Education (CICE) Volume 22, Issue 1, Special Issue 2020, KU Libraries)

Aside from geographical descriptors, other labels often applied to the region also allude to the core-periphery relationship described in World Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 1974). Some of these labels include “developing/developed”, “postcolonial”, the “global South”, and “Third World”. These labels have distinct epistemological origins as well as political implications, and have been applied, appropriated, and contested by scholars, practitioners, and activists on the ground - they illustrate the plurality around how labels are appropriated, negotiated, and contested. Below we explore how the frame of postcolonialism, and many of these other labels, apply to the South Asian region. Postcolonialism in South Asia Postcolonialism grew out of the fields of history, literature and cultural studies and provides critical analysis of European imperial power (Said, 1978; Fanon, 1961; Gandhi, 1998; Chakrabarty, 2000; Bhabba, 1994). In Orientalism, Said (1978) introduced an interpretation where the world was divided into the “orient” and the “occident”, with Western Europe as the “occident” and the rest of the world as the “orient”. This framing is often considered the genesis of the cultural concepts of the ‘West” and the “East”, mutually constitutive constructs where the West represents the Oriental world pejoratively as inferior, backwards, irrational, and exotic, juxtaposed against the rational, progressive, and modern West. The imposition of an East/West binary has led to the development of a subjugated colonial identity based on the dehumanization of colonized people of the East that continues on into the present day (Said, 1978; Fanon, 1961). Postcolonial scholars also point out that this dichotomous classification of West/East, third world/first world, developed/developing, etc. serves to homogenize and suppress people from different regions across the “East”, i.e. the Middle East, Africa, Indian Subcontinent, from being able to represent themselves as distinct cultures. This homogenization, or essentialization, enables the “West” to maintain power and control over the homogenous “Other” (Said, 1978). As explained further below, this dichotomous domination continues to frame present day efforts of development, or assistance to countries with poverty – most of whom are peripheral nations and former colonies (World Bank, 2020). We can see how this dichotomous classification provides necessary perspective into how power has been maintained and deployed.

#### Their use of the term “third world” to group the cities of diverse countries is an act of epistemic violence

Nyanzi 17, (Stella, “I AIN’T NO THIRD WORLD WOMAN OF COLOR,” In Contested Terrains of Women of Color and Third World Women, Hypatia vol. 32, no. 3 Summer 2017 Third World Women p. 740)

The deprivation, exploitation, and disruptions created through shared histories of colonialism and neocolonialisms lumped several unique countries from Africa, the Caribbean, Asia, and Latin America into one “Third World.” This Third World is a big dark amorphous place of stereotypical plight and lack. What homogenizing commonalities bind women from countries as disparate as Bolivia, Nepal, Uzbekistan, Djibouti, Nicaragua, and Burundi? Our historical trajectories into the Third World category are as diverse as our sociocultural, political, economic, and ideological contexts. Thus, our experiences as women from these different Third World contexts cannot be one and the same. Mohanty rebukes Western feminists for “the production of the ‘Third World Woman’ as a singular monolithic subject” (Mohanty 1984, 333). To be placed into the “Third World” is to be violated—both discursively and structurally. In comparison to others in the first world, one living in the Third World is perpetually judged and found inferior, underdeveloped, and still in the formative stages of becoming.

#### The discursive use of it is an act of discursive violence that dehumanizes and must be rejected

Martinez-Arnold 17, Grad student in Post Colonial Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ. (Etsil, 4/18/17, Why Saying The Phrase, ‘Third-World Country’, Might Be Problematic, <https://medium.com/@LeavesFromMyMentalPortfolio/why-saying-the-phrase-third-world-country-might-be-problematic-6f6bedb9da98>)

To many, what makes a country ‘third-world’ is the inadequate antithesis of the qualities that some countries like the U.S., ‘first-world’. By using these terms in politics, social studies, and even colloquial dialogue, we are perpetuating a narrative that America is above and other countries (third-world), are below. The narrative that America is the place to be and other nations are places to detest; America is rich in wealth, culture, values, and technology, whereas, other nations are poor, in just about everything. This narrative needs to change, drastically and swiftly. Factually, America will never have that title as white Americans are the apogee of success; that they ‘make up’ the ‘first-world’ and so we are to be like them. We as non-white folks need to be white to make it. As long as white Americans fill the roles of CEO’s, Chief of Staffs and Executive Directors, the ‘third-world’ title will never be attached to America. Hence-more, let’s analyze the nation of Belize for reference purposes. Belize is geographically slightly larger than the state of Massachusetts, population of little over 350,000 people. The country does not have public education, no governmental aid, lack of proper built architecture(board houses with zinc roofs overshadow cement houses), lack of jobs, significant poverty and homeless population, and the list goes on. Distinctly, many foreigners have been to Belize and comment on its beauty, as well as its downfalls. Many foreigners will, without a doubt, say that Belize is a ‘third-world country’. Does America have some of these qualities? Significant homeless and poverty population, lack of technology and resources in undeserved communities, lack of affordable housing, lack of rigorous and substantial education in low-income communities? Absolutely! These things do exist in the contemporary American society, as well as the contemporary Belizean society. As a matter of fact, as small as Belize is, it is two grade levels ahead of America, and they don’t compete or come near each other with tech resources in schools. A college degree in Belize is much more valuable than an American one. Belize does not have a problematic cultural society. It does not have ‘race’, but rather, ‘ethnic groups’. Belize treat everyone alike and do not see color, most of the times. These are facts! America is a country that has ‘third-world’ and ‘first-world’ traits — fact! Belize is a country that has ‘third-world and first-world’ traits — fact! These are facts! Both counties have both traits or qualities that would define a country as first of third-world. We must not elevate America anymore. Saying that a country is ‘third-world’ intimates that they do not have value. It creates images of incompetency and uninhabitable conditions. Simply, it hints at respective citizens in these countries as not human; of another species. A ‘they are not of this world, so they must be of another world that does not get how we live and how we do things’ mentality is eventually developed. That ideology contributes to the East-West divide that we currently have. It says that we as Americans are progressive and Middle Eastern counties are meek and weak, and that they just don’t get it. It also says that they treat themselves and their communities in a savagely way; they are not humans, and again, therefore, not of this world.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC as presented based on their use of the term “third world” as a label for countries. The term “third world” is an offensive construction that should be rejected

Caddie 9, is an economist, Member of Parliament and Minister for Economic Affairs and Investment in Barbados. (Marsha, 10/26/09, Are We Still Saying That? Because We Should Stop, <https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2009/10/26/guest-post-are-we-still-saying-that-because-we-should-stop/>)

While I was doing my post-grad work in Economics (capitalizing that word feels like such a joke), and even well before then, the academics in the know never tired of mentioning that We, as a collective of thinkers and activists, had ceased to use the expression Third World. Instead, we talked about developing nations, or less/least developed countries, a move to which I wholly subscribed, because although I feel quite alone in this, I detest the phrase Third World. But all of a sudden, everywhere I look, I see it springing up again. And I’m starting to wonder whether I only dreamt the popular rejection of the term years ago, or whether it’s enjoying some kind of rebirth. It certainly hasn’t been redefined: it’s a handy little moniker that encapsulates any brand of nastiness or degradation you might imagine, and it’s quite the punchline. Hate the state in which your office bathrooms are kept? Liken it to a Third World country. Annoyed that your hotel only offers three varieties of cream cheese at breakfast? Call it a Third World diet. It’s an exaggeration, see? So it’s funny! Lawl and stuff! Implicit in these comparisons is the realization that the speakers not only have no idea about the reality of life in the so-called Third World, but further, don’t give a crap. They’re able to so flippantly refer to the poverty and lack of opportunity in some of these nations because they’re comfortable – not with the actual state of things, of which they have only a vague knowledge, or none – but with the fabled state of things. Starvation, disease and war existing on such a scale for such a length of time need not be treated with any reverence or respect, one, because it is completely removed from their lives and doesn’t affect them, and two, because some of the countries of the global South have, in the estimation of these speakers, become horror stories in themselves, and thus have transitioned into some kind of mythical status. Except, we’re not talking about centaurs and unicorns here. We’re talking about real, live, accessible people’s lives, of which, if someone can hit Enter on a keyboard, they can approach some basic understanding. Further, the term Third World obscures all parts of a country’s culture apart from those which are to be pitied or improved. By no great coincidence, so does the mainstream media. Back in March, I highlighted the efforts of Chioma and Oluchi Ogwuegbu: two Nigerian sisters who had purposed to tell the story of the Africa behind all that media footage of distended bellies and power-hungry rebels. It’s not that a discussion of the problems of developing nations is not needed. It is. But when you commit to systematically representing a country solely as victims, you show only one part of who its people are, and not the greatest part. Third World also implies homogeneity across all the countries that are meant to comprise this class, one which simply does not exist economically, socially or politically. It suggests that regardless of level of economic and social development, comparative advantages or system of governance, they are all to be singularly treated always as less than. And the final issue I have with this term is perhaps the most obvious: it suggests a hierarchy that in people’s minds is not neatly restricted to some ranking of progress in development indicators, and certainly not to the historical allegiance of nations during the Cold War, as its origins are claimed to be, but is attached to real people and by association, their ethnicities. It suggests that the US with its White majority is innately better than, say, India, and encourages not an examination of global inequality as a result of historical exploitation, but of the notion that these countries have less because they are objectively worth less. And that was its intent. When Frenchman Alfred Sauvy coined the term half a century ago, he was so inspired to do by the presence of the Third Estate in France, the commoners who, by virtue of their position, Sauvy thought destined to be in an eternal state of revolution against the higher classes of the First and Second Estates. “Like the third estate,” he famously wrote, “the Third World has nothing, and wants to be something.” Leaders at the Bandung Conference that followed in 1955 embraced the designation as an indication of a new bloc, but that designation, tenuous even then, means nothing now. And anyone from a developing country who wants to reclaim the expression can, I suppose, go ahead and do so. I choose not to. I, as a Black woman from the Caribbean, am third in no one’s pecking order. This is not sensitivity to a useful academic category or definition – although even those types of objections often have merit. This is the thorough rejection of a highly stigmatized, completely arbitrary categorization that serves no purpose other than to equate a certain geographical provenance and ethnic heritage with lack and degradation. I do not accept it, and I would encourage allies of we who originate, live and work on human rights and development in the global South to also reject it.

### 1NC — DA

#### FTC fraud prevention is funded now---unexpected demands trade off

Bilirakis et al. 21 (Gus Michael Bilirakis is an American lawyer and politician serving as the U.S. Representative for Florida's 12th congressional district since 2013; Hon. Noah Joshua Phillips is a Commissioner at the Federal Trade Commission; Hon. Lina Khan is the Chair of the Federal Trade Commission, “Transforming the FTC: Legislation to Modernize Consumer Protection,” *Committee on Energy and Commerce*, 6/28/21, <https://energycommerce.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/hearing-on-transforming-the-ftc-legislation-to-modernize-consumer>)

Gus Bilirakis (3:12:44): Thank you. Our committee has worked extensively in a bipartisan manner to protect consumers from fraud and scams. Mr. Carter's Combating Pandemic Scams Act was enacted at the beginning of the year thanks to all of our leadership here. Representive Blunt Rochester's Fraud and Scam Reduction Act, as well as Representative Kelly's Protecting Seniors from Emergency Scams Act both cleared our chamber with bipartisan support this year. My bill, HR 2672, the FTC Reports Act, would require the FTC to report on fraud against our seniors. Commissioner Philips, how important is the work the FTC staff does to protect Americans from scams? Noah Josuha Phillips (3:13:33): Congressman, thank you for your question. The work we do to protect American consumers against frauds and scams, is our bread and butter as an agency. There is no work that makes me feel better as a commissioner, when we watch our ability to find bad guys, or taking money from American consumers, dipping into their life savings, and get that money back to them. So the work that you have done on the committee to provide funding, to provide tools for us to go after scam artists, is critical. And I think that needs to continue with the agency. Gus Bilirakis (3:14:05): Thank you, and Chair Khan, again, as you pursue other initiatives, when staff and resources be shifted away from the fraud program, which is so essential in preventing bad actors from harming our constituents? That's the question, please. Lina Khan (3:14:22): Sorry, could you repeat the question - when should services be shifted... Gus Bilirakis (3:14:26): Yes, of course. As you pursue other initiatives, when staff and resources be shifted away from your fraud program, which is so essential in preventing bad actors from harming our constituents? Lina Khan (3:14:40): Well, of course, we're always limited by the appropriations bills when it comes to thinking through how we're delegating resources across the agency. In certain instances, I think there are exigent needs that can arise in certain aspects. Gus Bilirakis (3:14:54): But you don't anticipate moving money from the fraud program, is that correct? Lina Khan (3:15:00): Not especially, but I mean, I think overall, we are trying to look through the prism of managerial efficiency and trying to understand how we can best use our resources, especially given some of the exigent circumstances and so we'll be continuing to make those determinations. Gus Bilirakis (3:15:15): I suggest that you not because this is such a very important program. Commissioner Wilson, can you elaborate on why the FTC Reports Act would also prove beneficial to increasing much needed transparency and the flow of information within the commission?

#### Unplanned expanded enforcement drains finite resources from existing priorities

Dafny 21, Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School and the John F. Kennedy School of Government, and former Deputy Director for Healthcare and Antitrust in the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission. Professor Dafny’s research focuses on competition in health care markets, and the intersection of industry and public policy. (Leemore, “The Covid-19 Pandemic Should Not Delay Actions to Prevent Anticompetitive Consolidation in US Health Care Markets,” *Pro Market*, <https://promarket.org/2021/06/10/covid-pandemic-consolidation-pandemic-monopoly/>)

However, as Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter, the current acting FTC chair has noted, these efforts have “faced resistance, with two of these recent victories only coming after district court setbacks.” Blocking a horizontal merger, even when it appears to be an “open and shut” case to a layperson, requires extraordinary resources, including large investigation and litigation teams, as well as economic and other subject matter experts who must analyze the transaction, lay out the case for blocking the merger, and rebut arguments advanced by Defendants’ attorneys and experts. To pick a recent example, consider the proposed merger of two hospital systems in the Memphis area, which the FTC filed to block in November 2020. Based on the FTC’s complaint, the merger would have reduced the number of competing systems from four to three and created a system with over a 50 percent market share. In the face of litigation, the parties abandoned the deal—consistent with this being a straightforward case. Although the FTC prevailed without a trial, it took nearly a year from the merger announcement to the abandonment. Over that period, the FTC likely devoted thousands of staff hours to the investigation and lawsuit and expended substantial taxpayer resources on expert witnesses. The higher the payoff from the merger for the merging parties—and the payoff in the case of an increase in market power can be substantial—the greater the incentive for defendants to invest extraordinary resources to fight a merger challenge. Even if there is only a middling (and in some cases, small) chance of getting a merger through, it may well be in the parties’ interest to see if they can prevail, absorbing the agencies’ (i.e., DOJ and FTC’s) scarce resources in that attempt and preventing them from devoting those resources to investigate other transactions or anticompetitive practices. The substantial resources required to challenge transactions, paired with stagnating enforcement budgets, may explain why authorities have elected not to challenge some horizontal transactions they would likely have challenged in previous eras. Using data on a wide range of industries, antitrust scholar John Kwoka documents that enforcers rarely raise concerns about changes in market structure that used to draw scrutiny—that is, mergers that yield five or more market participants.

#### Fraud leads to widespread deforestation---triggers global species loss

Wilder 21, certified fraud examiner (Mason, “Global deforestation facilitated via fraud,” ACFE, <https://www.acfe.com/article.aspx?id=4295013024>)

Illegal logging companies in the Amazon regions, which are driving deforestation, are using multiple fraud schemes. They include fake or forged permits based on fraudulent information; corruption and collusion of and with officials who are supposed to enforce timber regulations; and front companies to avoid taxes.

During the summer of 2020, images and reports of fires raging in the world’s largest rainforest pervaded news cycles and social media for the second consecutive year. Deforestation and climate change have become a focus of debates about environmental impacts and the sustainability of logging, ranching and agricultural industries.

Although Amazon countries’ governments offer legal mechanisms for timber extraction and land clearing for agricultural or livestock purposes, illegal logging continues to plague the region. Governments in the Amazon region face an immense challenge combating illegal logging and the resulting deforestation. This is because of difficulties monitoring remote operations using limited resources, which leads to significant environmental and financial impacts. (See Razing the land to feed massive timber hunger, World Wildlife Federation.)

According to the National Whistleblower Center (NWC), illegal logging dramatically increases carbon emissions, which exacerbates climate change and air quality issues, and threatens endangered species and distorts global markets. The NWC also cites examples of the illegal timber trade in Indonesia, Russia, Mozambique, Gabon, Madagascar, India, the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). (See Protect Forests from Industrial Logging, National Whistleblower Center.)

#### Extinction

Torres 16, Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, and founder of the X-Risks Institute. He has published widely on emerging technologies, terrorism, and existential risks, with articles appearing in Skeptic, Free Inquiry, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Salon, Truthout, Erkenntnis, Metaphilosophy, Foresight, Journal of Future Studies, and the Journal of Evolution and Technology (Phil, “Biodiversity Loss: An Existential Risk Comparable to Climate Change,” Future of Life, <https://futureoflife.org/2016/05/20/biodiversity-loss/>)

According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the two greatest existential threats to human civilization stem from climate change and nuclear weapons. Both pose clear and present dangers to the perpetuation of our species, and the increasingly dire climate situation and nuclear arsenal modernizations in the United States and Russia were the most significant reasons why the Bulletin decided to keep the Doomsday Clock set at three minutes before midnight earlier this year. But there is another existential threat that the Bulletin overlooked in its Doomsday Clock announcement: biodiversity loss. This phenomenon is often identified as one of the many consequences of climate change, and this is of course correct. But biodiversity loss is also a contributing factor behind climate change. For example, deforestation in the Amazon rainforest and elsewhere reduces the amount of carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere by plants, a natural process that mitigates the effects of climate change. So the causal relation between climate change and biodiversity loss is bidirectional. Furthermore, there are myriad phenomena that are driving biodiversity loss in addition to climate change. Other causes include ecosystem fragmentation, invasive species, pollution, oxygen depletion caused by fertilizers running off into ponds and streams, overfishing, human overpopulation, and overconsumption. All of these phenomena have a direct impact on the health of the biosphere, and all would conceivably persist even if the problem of climate change were somehow immediately solved. Such considerations warrant decoupling biodiversity loss from climate change, because the former has been consistently subsumed by the latter as a mere effect. Biodiversity loss is a distinct environmental crisis with its own unique syndrome of causes, consequences, and solutions—such as restoring habitats, creating protected areas (“biodiversity parks”), and practicing sustainable agriculture. Deforestation of the Amazon rainforest decreases natural mitigation of CO2. Deforestation of the Amazon rainforest decreases natural mitigation of CO2 and destroys the habitats of many endangered species. The sixth extinction. The repercussions of biodiversity loss are potentially as severe as those anticipated from climate change, or even a nuclear conflict. For example, according to a 2015 study published in Science Advances, the best available evidence reveals “an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over the last few centuries, indicating that a sixth mass extinction is already under way.” This conclusion holds, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone. The article argues that, using its conservative figures, the average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction. (Other scientists have suggested that the current extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than normal.) As the authors write, “The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history and highly unusual in Earth’s history.” Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the previous “Big Five,” the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago. But the concept of biodiversity encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also refers to the size of different populations of species. With respect to this phenomenon, multiple studies have confirmed that wild populations around the world are dwindling and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 Global Biodiversity Outlook report found that the population of wild vertebrates living in the tropics dropped by 59 percent between 1970 and 2006. The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying. Consistent with these data, the 2014 Living Planet Report shows that the global population of wild vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid projecting historical trends into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006 study published in Science does precisely this: It projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to patterns of human activity, there will be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048. 48% of the world's primates are threatened with extinction. 48% of the world’s primates are threatened with extinction. Catastrophic consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization. As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive. Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.) The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime. The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.

## 1NC — Tech Innovation

### 1NC — AT: Genetic Diversity

#### Crop diversity is increasing internationally

Colin Khoury 18, Research Scientist at the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), Colombia and at the USDA National Laboratory for Genetic Resources Preservation, “Evaluating Claims GMOs and Modern Agriculture have Led to a 75% Drop in Crop Diversity”, Genetic Literacy Project, 12/14/2018, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2018/12/14/myth-busting-modern-agriculture-really-led-75-drop-crop-diversity/

One of the central concepts that unifies those concerned with biodiversity is the belief that diversity is being lost, piece by piece, to a greater or lesser degree, globally.

The same goes for the biodiversity of what we eat. Scientists and activists have worried about the loss of crops and their many traditional varieties for at least a hundred years, since botanist N. I. Vavilov traveled the world in search of plants useful for cultivation in his Russian homeland. He noticed that diversity was disappearing in the cradles of agriculture – places where crops had been cultivated continuously for thousands of years. The alarm sounded even louder 50 years ago, during the Green Revolution, when farmers in some of the most diverse regions of the world largely replaced their many locally adapted wheat, rice, and other grain varieties with fewer, more uniform, higher yielding professionally bred varieties.

Economic development, human migration, urbanization, and globalization have further affected the diversity of food crops cultivated and consumed around the world. Most modern farmers seem to want uniform, mechanized production. Most eaters seem to want unblemished vegetables of known shapes and sizes, and inexpensive processed food products. In most of the decisions producers, food distributors, and consumers make, crop diversity inadvertently gets the short end of the stick.

This is ironic, since modern productive crop varieties are bred by wisely mixing and matching diverse genetic resources. The disappearance of old varieties thus reduces the options available to plant breeders, including those working to produce more nutritious and resilient crops. Genebank collections, such as the beans, cassava, and other staples conserved at CIAT, which were originally built to provide access for plant breeders to genetic resources, have therefore taken on increasingly important conservation roles.

In many regions of the world, the loss of crop diversity also has profound cultural and spiritual significance, with seeds no longer handed down through generations and no longer connecting people as closely to the places they call home. What people cultivate and what they eat are important to how they identify themselves, both as cultures and as individuals. “We are what we eat.”

Taking stock

Being a food biodiversity scientist, I grew up (in the professional sense) with the loss of crop diversity looming over my head, providing both a raison d’être and an urgency to my efforts. Somewhere along the line, I became interested in understanding its magnitude. That is, counting how many crops and how many varieties have been lost.

And that’s where it started to become complicated, and also more interesting. Because, when I went looking for signs of the loss of specific crops, I couldn’t find any. Instead, I found evidence of massive global changes in our food diversity that left me worried, but at the same time hopeful.

A bit of background. Most of the numbers seen in the news on how much crop diversity has been lost go back to a handful of reports and books that reference a few studies: for example, the changing number of vegetable varieties for sale in the U.S. over time. The results are estimations for a few crops at local to national levels, but they somehow have been inflated to generalized statements about the global state of crop diversity, the most common of which is some variation of “75% of the diversity in crops has been lost.”

Putting true numbers on diversity loss turns out to be a complicated and contested business, with no shortage of strong opinions. One big part of the problem is that there aren’t many good ways to count the diversity that existed before it disappeared. Researchers have done some work to assess the changes in diversity in crop varieties of Green Revolution cereals, and to some degree on the genetic diversity within those varieties. The results indicate that, although diversity on farms decreased when farmers first replaced traditional varieties with modern types, the more recent trends are not so simple to decipher.

Reviewing what had been researched, it was particularly surprising to me that very little work had been done to understand the changes in what is probably the simplest level to measure: the diversity of crop species in the human diet, that is, how successful is maize versus rice versus potato versus quinoa and so on. I realized that data on the contribution of crops to national food supplies were available for almost all countries worldwide via FAOSTAT, with information for every year since 1961. Perhaps these were the data that could show when a particular grain, or legume, or vegetable, fell off the world map, and just how diverse our global food supply is now compared to half a century ago.

Fast forward through a couple of years of investigation. To my surprise, I found that not a single crop was lost over the past 50 years! There was no evidence for extinction. What was going on? Was I missing something or was the loss of food biodiversity narrative wrong?

It turns out that my failure to see any loss of crops was due in large part to the lack of sufficient resolution in the FAO food supply data. Only 52 meaningful crop species-specific commodities are measured and a number of these are general groupings such as “cereals, other.” Because of this lack of specificity, the data couldn’t comprehensively assess the crops that have been most vulnerable to changes in the global food system over the past 50 years.

Related article: Viewpoint: 'Heritage' of emotional decision-making fuels EU's opposition to biotech crops

In FAO data, these plants are either thrown into the general categories or they aren’t measured at all, especially if they are produced only on a small scale, for local markets or in home gardens. This is, in itself, sign enough that they may be imperiled. We need better statistics about what people eat (and grow) around the world. But, enough is known to be confident that many locally relevant crops are in decline.

But that’s not to say that the data weren’t useful to the question at hand. With some further analysis, they eventually provided what I think is a powerful argument for further concern about the loss of crop diversity globally. Yet, at the same time, they also offer some hope.

Over the past 50 years, almost all countries’ diets actually became more diverse, not less, for the crops that FAO statistics do report. We found that traditional diets that were primarily based on singular staples a half century ago, for instance rice in Southeast Asia, had diversified over time to include other staples such as wheat and potatoes. The same was true for maize-based diets in Latin America, sorghum- and millet-based diets in sub-Saharan Africa, and so on. Diets around the world were balancing out with regard to the contribution of these foods.

Not that there weren’t plant winners and losers. Wheat, rice, and maize, the most dominant crops worldwide 50 years ago, became more important globally. Other crops emerged as widespread staples, particularly oilcrops such as soybean, palm oil, sunflower, and rapeseed oil. And, as the winners came to take more precedence in food supplies around the world, alternative staples such as sorghum, millets, rye, cassava, sweet potato, and yam were marginalized. They haven’t disappeared (at least not yet), but they have become less important to what is eaten every day.

As countries’ food supplies became more diverse in the winner crops reported by FAO, and the relative abundance of these crops within diets became more even, food supplies worldwide became much more similar. If we are what we eat, then it seems that we are quickly becoming very much the same type of human being ‒ modern people eating globalized food crops.

The publication of our findings of increasing homogeneity in global food supplies generated substantial scientific and public interest. This wasn’t, I think, because the main finding was a big shocker. It’s easy to see how pizza is now available in Tokyo, bread available in traditional maize and potato regions of Latin America, and McDonalds, Subway, and Starbucks available, well, almost everywhere. Rather, I think it’s because we were able to examine the food supplies of virtually all the countries of the world, over a relatively long time period, and put some real numbers to the change we saw. On average, for instance, the amount of variation between food supplies in different countries decreased by 68.8% from 1961 to 2009.

This is why, although we could see no absolute loss in crops consumed over the past 50 years, I am concerned. For even in the relatively small list of crops reported in the FAO national food supply data, . That doesn’t seem like a good thing for the long-term resilience of our agricultural areas, nor for human health, although it’s important to remember that such changes are the collateral damage resulting from the creation of highly productive mega-crop farming systems, which have increased the affordability of these foods worldwide, leading to less stunting and other effects of undernutrition worldwide. On the other hand, global dependence on a few select crops equates to expansive monocultures, with more lives riding on the outcome of the game of cat and mouse between pestilence and uniform varieties grown over large areas. Moreover, cheaply available macronutrients sourcing from these crops have contributed to the negative effects of the nutrition transition, including obesity, heart disease, and diabetes.

So why then am I hopeful? Because the data, and some literature, and my own direct experience also indicate that diets in recent years, in some countries, are beginning to move in different directions, reducing the excessive use of animal products and other energy-dense and environmentally expensive foods, and becoming more diverse, particularly with regard to fruits and vegetables, and even healthy grains. This seems good, both for human health and for the sustainability of agricultural production. Change is still occurring, and the future does not appear to be fixed. What better evidence than quinoa, which was relatively unknown outside the Andes a couple of decades ago, and is now cultivated in 100 countries and consumed in even more?

### 1NC — AT: Food Wars

#### The food impact —

#### 1 — Cribb concedes that Russia and Canada fill-in and resolve any shortfall from US ag — we read blue

Julian 1AC Cribb 19, Adjunct Professor, University of Technology, Sydney. Principal, Julian Cribb & Associates. Author, Journalist, Editor & Science Communicator, "Hotspots for Food Conflict in the Twenty-first Century," in Food or War, Chapter 5, 2019, pg. 141-173.

The mounting threat to world peace posed by a food, climate and ecosystem increasingly compromised and unstable was emphasised by the US Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, in a briefing to the US Senate in early 2019. ‘Global environmental and ecological degradation, as well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for resources, economic distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond’, he said. ‘Climate hazards such as extreme weather, higher temperatures, droughts, floods, wildfires, storms, sea level rise, soil degradation, and acidifying oceans are intensifying, threatening infrastructure, health, and water and food security. Irreversible damage to ecosystems and habitats will undermine the economic benefits they provide, worsened by air, soil, water, and marine pollution.’ Boldly, Coats delivered his warning at a time when the US President, Trump, was attempting to expunge all reference to climate from government documents.23 Based upon these recent cases of food conflicts, and upon the lessons gleaned from the longer history of the interaction between food and war, several regions of the planet face a greatly heightened risk of conflict towards the mid twenty-first century. Food wars often start out small, as mere quarrels over grazing rights, access to wells or as one faction trying to control food supplies and markets. However, if not resolved quickly these disputes can quickly escalate into violence, then into civil conflagrations which, if not quelled, can in turn explode into crises that reverberate around the planet in the form of soaring prices, floods of refugees and the involvement of major powers – which in turn carries the risk of transnational war. The danger is magnified by swollen populations, the effects of climate change, depletion of key resources such as water, topsoil and nutrients, the collapse of ecosystem services that support agriculture and fisheries, universal pollution, a widening gap between rich and poor, and the rise of vast megacities unable to feed themselves (Figure 5.3).

Chart

Description automatically generated

Each of the world’s food ‘powderkeg regions’ is described below, in ascending order of risk. United States In one sense, food wars have already broken out in the United States, the most overfed country on Earth. Here the issue is chiefly the growing depletion of the nation’s mighty groundwater resources, especially in states using it for food production, and the contest over what remains between competing users – farmers, ranchers and Native Americans on the one hand and the oil, gas and mining industry on the other. Concern about the future of US water supplies was aggravated by a series of savage droughts in the early twentyfirst century in the west, south and mid-west linked to global climate change and declining snowpack in the Rocky Mountains, both of which affect not only agriculture but also the rate at which the nation’s groundwater reserves recharge. ‘Groundwater depletion has been a concern in the Southwest and High Plains for many years, but increased demands on our groundwater resources have overstressed aquifers in many areas of the Nation, not just in arid regions’, notes the US Geological Survey.24 Nine US states depend on groundwater for between 50 per cent and 80 per cent of their total freshwater supplies, and five states account for nearly half of the nation’s groundwater use. Major US water resources, such as the High Plains aquifers and the Pacific Northwest aquifers have sunk by 30–50 metres (100–150 feet) since exploitation began, imperilling the agricultural industries that rely on them. In the arid southwest, aquifer declines of 100–150 metres have been recorded (Figure 5.4). [Figure omitted] To take but one case, the famed Ogallala Aquifer in the High Plains region supports cropping industries worth more than US $20 billion a year and was in such a depleted state it would take more than 6000 years to replace by natural infiltration the water drawn from it by farmers in the past 150 years. As it dwindles, some farmers have tried to kick their dependence on groundwater – other users, including the growing cities and towns of the region, proceeded to mine it as if there was no tomorrow.25 A study by Kansas State University concluded that so far, 30 per cent of the local groundwater had been extracted and another 39 per cent would be depleted by the mid century on existing trends in withdrawal and recharge.26 Over half the US population relies on groundwater for drinking; both rural and urban America are at risk. Cities such as New Orleans, Houston and Miami face not only rising sea levels – but also sinking land, due to the extraction of underlying groundwater. In Memphis, Tennessee, the aquifer that supplies the city’s drinking water has dropped by 20 metres. Growing awareness of the risk of a nation, even one as large and technologically adept as the USA, having insufficient water to grow its food, generate its exports and supply its urban homes has fuelled tensions leading to the eruption of nationwide protests over ‘fracking’ for oil and gas – a process that can deplete or poison groundwater – and the building of oil pipelines, which have a habit of rupturing and also polluting water resources. The boom in fracking and piping is part of a deliberate US policy to become more self-reliant in fossil fuels.27 Thus, in its anxiety to be independent of overseas energy suppliers, the USA in effect decided to barter away its future food security for current oil security – and the price of this has been a lot of angry farmers, Native Americans and concerned citizens. The depletion of US groundwater coincides with accelerating climate risk, which may raise US temperatures by as much as 4–5 C by 2100, leading to major losses in soil moisture throughout the US grain belt, and the spread of deserts in the south and west. Food production will also be affected by fiercer storms, bigger floods, more heatwaves, an increase in drought frequency and greater impacts from crop and livestock diseases. In such a context, it is no time to be wasting stored water. The case of the USA is included in the list of world ‘hot spots’ for future food conflict, not because there is danger of a serious shooting war erupting over water in America in the foreseeable future, but to illustrate that even in technologically advanced countries unforeseen social tensions and crises are on the rise over basic resources like food, land and water and their depletion. This doesn’t just happen in Africa or the Middle East. It’s a global phenomenon. Furthermore, the USA is the world’s largest food exporter and any retreat on its part will have a disproportionate effect on world food price and supply. There is still plenty of time to replan America’s food systems and water usage – but, as in the case of fossil fuels and climate, rear-guard action mounted by corporate vested interests and their hired politicians may well [freeze] ~~paralyse~~ the national will to do it. That is when the US food system could find itself at serious risk, losing access to water in a time of growing climatic disruption, caused by exactly the same forces as those depleting the groundwater: the fossil fuels sector and its political stooges. The probable effect of this will, in the first instance, be a decline in US meat and dairy production accompanied by rising prices and a fall in its feedgrain exports, with domino effects on livestock industries worldwide. The flip-side to this issue is that America’s old rival, Russia, is likely to gain in both farmland and water availability as the planet warms through the twentyfirst century – and likewise Canada. Both these countries stand to prosper from a US withdrawal from world food markets, and together they may negate the effects of any US food export shortfalls. Central and South America South America is one of the world’s most bountiful continents in terms of food production – but, after decades of improvement, malnutrition is once more on the rise, reaching a new peak of 42.5 million people affected in 2016.28 ‘Latin America and the Caribbean used to be a worldwide example in the fight against hunger. We are now following the worrisome global trend’, said regional FAO representative Julio Berdegué.29 Paradoxically, obesity is increasing among Latin American adults, while malnutrition is rising among children. ‘Although Latin America and the Caribbean produce enough food to meet the needs of their population, this does not ensure healthy and nutritious diets’, the FAO explains. Worsening income inequality, poor access to food and persistent poverty are contributing to the rise in hunger and bad diets, it adds.30 ‘The impact of climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean will be considerable because of its economic dependence on agriculture, the low adaptive capacity of its population and the geographical location of some of its countries’, an FAO report warned.31 Emerging food insecurity in Central and Latin America is being driven by a toxic mixture of failing water supplies, drying farmlands, poverty, maladministration, incompetence and corruption. These issues are exacerbated by climate change, which is making the water supply issue worse for farmers and city people alike in several countries and delivering more weather disasters to agriculture. Mexico has for centuries faced periodic food scarcity, with a tenth of its people today suffering under-nutrition. In 2008 this rose to 18 per cent, leading to outbreaks of political violence.32 In 2013, 52 million Mexicans were suffering poverty and seven million more faced extreme hunger, despite the attempts of successive governments to remedy the situation. By 2100 northern Mexico is expected to warm by 4–5 C and southern Mexico by 1.5–2.5 C. Large parts of the country, including Mexico City, face critical water scarcity. Mexico’s cropped area could fall by 40–70 per cent by the 2030s and disappear completely by the end of the century, making it one of the world’s countries most at risk from catastrophic climate change and a major potential source of climate refugees.33 The vanishing lakes and glaciers of the high Andes confront montane nations – Bolivia, Peru and Chile especially – with the spectre of growing water scarcity and declining food security. The volume of many glaciers, which provide meltwater to the region’s rivers, which in turn irrigate farmland, has halved since 1975.34 Bolivia’s second largest water body, the 2000 square kilometres Lake Poopo, dried out completely.35 The loss of water is attributed partly to El Niño droughts, partly to global warming and partly to over-extraction by the mining industries of the region. Chile, with 24,000 glaciers (80 per cent of all those in Latin America) is feeling the effects of their retreat and shrinkage especially, both in large cities such as the capital Santiago, and in irrigation agriculture and energy supply. Chile is rated by the World Resources Institute among the countries most likely to experience extreme water stress by 2040.36 Climate change is producing growing water and food insecurity in the ‘dry corridor’ of Central America, in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Here a combination of drought, major floods and soil erosion is undermining efforts to raise food production and stabilise nutrition. Food production in Venezuela began falling in the 1990s, and by the late 2010s two thirds of the population were malnourished; there was a growing flood of refugees into Colombia and other neighbouring countries. The food crisis has been variously blamed on the Venezuelan government’s ‘Great Leap Forward’ (modelled on that of China – which also caused widespread starvation), a halving in Venezuela’s oil export earnings, economic sanctions by the USA, and corruption. However, local scientists such as Nobel Laureate Professor Juan Carlos Sánchez warn that climate impacts are already striking the densely populated coastal regions with increased torrential rains, flooding and mudslides, droughts and hurricanes, while inland areas are drying out and desertifying, leading to crop failures, water scarcity and a tide of climate refugees.37 These factors will tend to deepen food insecurity towards the mid century. Venezuela’s climate refugees are already making life more difficult for neighbouring countries such as Colombia. Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has, in recent decades, removed around 20 per cent of its total tree cover, replacing it with dry savannah and farmland. At 40 per cent clearance and with continued global warming, scientists anticipate profound changes in the local climate, towards a drying trend, which will hammer the agriculture that has replaced the forest.38 Brazil has already wiped out the oncevast Mata Atlantica forest along its eastern coastline, and this region is now drying, with resultant water stress for both farming and major cities like São Paulo. Brazil’s outlook for 2100 is for further drying – tied to forest loss as well as global climate change – increased frequency of drought and heatwaves, major fires and acute water scarcity in some regions. Moreover, as the Amazon basin dries out, it will release vast quantities of CO2 from its peat swamps and rainforest soils. These are thought to contain in excess of three billion tonnes of carbon and could cause a significant acceleration in global warming, affecting everyone on Earth.39 Latin America is the world capital of private armies, with as many as 50 major guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, terrorist, indigenous and criminal insurgencies over the past half century – exemplified in familiar names like the Sandanistas (Nicaragua), FARC (Colombia) and Shining Path (Peru).40 Many of these drew their initial inspiration from the international communist movement of the mid twentieth century, while others are right-wing groups set up in opposition to them or else represent land rights movements of disadvantaged groups. However, all these movements rely for oxygen on simmering public discontent with ineffectual or corrupt governments and lack of fair access to food, land and water generally. In other words, the tendency of South and Central America towards internal armed conflict is supercharged significantly by failings in the food system which generate public anger, leading to sympathy and support for anyone seen to be challenging the incumbent regimes. This is not to suggest that feeding every person well would end all insurgencies – but it would certainly take the wind of popular support out of a lot of their sails. In that sense the revolutionary tendency of South America echoes the preconditions for revolution in France and Russia in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. Central Asia The risk of wars breaking out over water, energy and food insecurity in Central Asia is high.41 Here, the five main players – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – face swelling populations, crumbling Soviet-era infrastructure, flagging resource cooperation, a degrading landscape, deteriorating food availability and a changing climate. At the heart of the issue and the region’s increasingly volatile politics is water: ‘Without water in the region’s two great rivers – the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya – vital crops in the downstream agricultural powerhouses would die. Without power, life in the upstream countries would be unbearable in the freezing winters’, wrote Rustam Qobil.42 Central Asia’s water crisis first exploded onto the global consciousness with the drying of the Aral Sea – the world’s fourth largest lake – from the mid 1960s43, following the damming and draining of major rivers such as the Amu Darya, Syr Darya and Naryn. It was hastened by a major drought in 200844 exacerbated by climate change, which is melting the ‘water tower’ of glacial ice stored in the Tien Shan, Pamir and Hindu Kush mountain ranges that feed the region’s rivers. The Tien Shan alone holds 10,000 glaciers, all of them in retreat, losing an estimated 223 million cubic metres a year. At such a rate of loss the region’s rivers will run dry within a generation.45 Lack of water has already delivered a body blow to Central Asia’s efforts to modernise its agriculture, adding further tension to regional disputes over food, land and water. ‘Water has always been a major cause of wars and border conflicts in the Central Asian region’, policy analyst Fuad Shahbazov warned. This potential for conflict over water has been exacerbated by disputes over the Fergana valley, the region’s greatest foodbowl, which underwent a 32 per cent surge in population in barely ten years – while more and more of it turned to desert.46 The Central Asian region is ranked by the World Resources Institute as one of the world’s most perilously water-stressed regions to 2040 (Figure 5.6). With their economies hitting rock bottom, corrupt and autocratic governments that prefer to blame others for their problems and growing quarrels over food, land, energy and water, the ‘Stans’ face ‘a perfect storm’, Nate Shenkkan wrote in the journal Foreign Policy. 47 Increased meddling by Russia and China is augmenting the explosive mix: China regards Central Asia as a key component of its ‘Belt and Road’ initiative intended to expand its global influence, whereas Russia hopes to lure the region back into its own economic sphere. Their rival investments may help limit some of the problems faced by Central Asia – or they may unlock a fresh cycle of political feuding, turmoil and regime change.48 A 2017 FAO report found 14.3 million people – one in every five – in Central Asia did not have enough to eat and a million faced actual starvation, children especially. It noted that after years of steady improvement, the situation was deteriorating. This combination of intractable and deteriorating factors makes Central Asia a serious internal war risk towards the mid twentyfirst century, with involvement by superpowers raising the danger of international conflict and mass refugee flight. The Middle East The Middle East is the most water-stressed region on Earth (see Figure 5.5 above). It is ‘particularly vulnerable to climate change. It is one of the world’s most water-scarce and dry regions, with a high dependency on climate-sensitive agriculture and a large share of its population and economic activity in flood-prone urban coastal zones’, according to the World Bank.49 The Middle East – consisting of the 22 countries of the Arab League, Turkey and Iran – has very low levels of natural rainfall to begin with. Most of it has 600 millimetres or less per year and is classed as arid. ‘The Middle East and North Africa [MENA] is a global hotspot of unsustainable water use, especially of groundwater. In some countries, more than half of current water withdrawals exceed what is naturally available’, the Bank said in a separate report on water scarcity.50 [Figure omitted] ‘The climate is predicted to become even hotter and drier in most of the MENA region. Higher temperatures and reduced precipitation will increase the occurrence of droughts. It is further estimated that an additional 80–100 million people will be exposed by 2025 to water stress’, the Bank added. The region’s population of 300 million in the late 2010s is forecast to double to 600 million by 2050. Average temperatures are expected to rise by 3–5 C and rainfall will decrease by around 20 per cent. The result will be vastly increased water stress, accelerated desertification, growing food insecurity and a rise in sea levels displacing tens of millions from densely populated, low-lying areas like the Nile delta.51 The region is deemed highly vulnerable to climate impacts, warns a report by the UN Development Programme. ‘Current climate change projections show that by the year 2025, the water supply in the Arab region will be only 15 per cent of levels in 1960. With population growth around 3 per cent annually and deforestation spiking to 4 per cent annually... the region now includes 14 of the world’s 20 most water-stressed countries.’ 52 The Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region has 6 per cent of the world’s population with only 1.5 per cent of the world’s fresh water reserves to share among them. This means that the average citizen already has about a third less water than the minimum necessary for a reasonable existence – many have less than half, and populations are growing rapidly. Coupled with political chaos and ill governance in many countries, growing religious and ethnic tensions between different groups – often based on centuries-old disputes – a widening gap between rich and poor and foreign meddling by the USA, Russia and China, shortages of food, land and water make the Middle East an evident cauldron for conflict in the twentyfirst century. Growing awareness of their food risk has impelled some oil-rich Arab states into an international farm buying spree, purchasing farming, fishing and food processing companies in countries as assorted as South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Philippines, Ukraine, the USA, Poland, Argentina, Australia, Brazil and Morocco. In some food-stressed countries these acquisitions have already led to riots and killings.53 The risk is high that, by exporting its own food–land–water problems worldwide, especially to regions already facing scarcity, the Middle East could propagate conflicts and government collapses around the globe. This is despite the fact that high-tech solar desalination, green energy, hydroponics, aquaponics and other intensive urban food production technologies make it possible for the region to produce far more of its own food locally, if not to be entirely self-sufficient. Dimensions of the growing crisis in the Middle East include the following. Wars have already broken out in Syria and Yemen in which scarcity of food, land and water were prominent among the tensions that led to conflict between competing groups. Food, land and water issues feed into and exacerbate already volatile sentiment over religion, politics, corruption, mismanagement and foreign interference by the USA, China and Russia. The introduction of cheap solar-powered and diesel pumps has accelerated the unsustainable extraction of groundwater throughout the region, notably in countries like Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Morocco.54 Turkish building of new dams to monopolise waters flowing across its borders is igniting scarcity and potential for conflict with downstream nations, including Iraq, Iran and Syria.55 Egypt’s lifeline, the Nile, is threatened by Ethiopian plans to dam the Blue Nile, with tensions that some observers consider could lead to a shooting war.56 There are very low levels of water recycling throughout the region, while water use productivity is about half that of the world as a whole. There is a lack of a sense of citizen responsibility for water and food scarcity throughout the region. Land grabs around the world by oil-rich states are threatening to destabilise food, land and water in other countries and regions, causing conflict. A decline in oil prices and the displacement of oil by the global renewables revolution may leave the region with fewer economic options for solving its problems. There is a risk that acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Iran may set off a nuclear arms race in the region with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and possibly Turkey following suit and Israel rearming to stay in the lead. This would translate potential food, land and water conflicts into the atomic realm. Together these issues, and failure to address their root causes, make the Middle East a fizzing powder keg in the twentyfirst century. The question is when and where, not whether, it explodes – and whether the resulting conflict will involve the use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, thus affecting the entire world. China China is the world’s biggest producer, importer and consumer of food. Much of the landmass of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is too mountainous or too arid for farming, but the rich soils of its eastern and southern regions are highly productive provided sufficient water is available and climate impacts are mild. Those, however, are very big ‘ifs’. In 1995, American environmentalist Lester R. Brown both irked and aroused the PRC Communist Party bosses with a small, hard-hitting book entitled Who Will Feed China? Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet. 57 In it he posited that Chinese population growth was so far out of control that the then-agricultural system could not keep up, and China would be forced to import vast amounts of grain, to the detriment of food prices and availability worldwide. His fears, so far, have not been realised – not because they were unsoundly based, but because China managed – just – to stay abreast of rising food demand by stabilising and subsidising grain prices, restoring degraded lands, boosting agricultural science and technology, piping water from south to north, developing high-intensity urban farms, buying up foreign farmland worldwide and encouraging young Chinese to leave the country. What Brown didn’t anticipate was the economic miracle that made China rich enough to afford all this. However, his essential thesis remains valid: China’s food supply will remain on a knife-edge for the entire twentyfirst century, vulnerable especially to water scarcity and climate impacts. If the nation outruns its domestic resources yet still has to eat, it may well be at the expense of others globally. Some western commentators were puzzled when China scrapped its 35-year ‘One Child Policy’ in 2015, but in fact the policy had done its job, shaving around 300 million people off the projected peak of Chinese population. It was also causing serious imbalances, such as China’s huge unmarried male surplus. Furthermore, rising urbanisation and household incomes meant Chinese parents no longer wanted large families, as in the past. Policy or no policy, China’s birthrate has continued to fall and by 2018 was 1.6 babies per woman – well below replacement, lower than the USA and nearly as low as Germany. Its population was 1.4 billion, but this was growing at barely 0.4 per cent a year, with the growth due at least in part to lengthening life expectancy.58 For China, female fertility is no longer the key issue. The critical issue is water. And the critical region is the north, where 41 per cent of the population reside. Here surface and groundwaters – which support not only the vast grain and vegetable farming industries of the North China Plain but also burgeoning megacities like Beijing, Tianjin and Shenyang – have been vanishing at an alarming rate. ‘In the past 25 years, 28,000 rivers have disappeared. Groundwater has fallen by up to 1–3 metres a year. One consequence: parts of Beijing are subsiding by 11 cm a year. The flow of the Yellow River, water supply to millions, is a tenth of what it was in the 1940s; it often fails to reach the sea. Pollution further curtails supply: in 2017 8.8 per cent of water was unfit even for agricultural or industrial use’, the Financial Times reported.59 On the North China Plain, annual consumption of water for all uses, including food production, is about 27 billion cubic metres a year – compared with an annual water availability of 22 billion cubic metres, a deficit that is made up by the short-term expedient of mining the region’s groundwater.60 To stave off disaster, the PRC has built a prodigious network of canals and pipelines from the Yangtse River in the water-rich south, to Beijing in the water-starved north. Hailed as a ‘lifeline’, the South–North Water Transfer Project had two drawbacks: first, the fossil energy required to pump millions of tonnes of water over a thousand kilometres and, second, the fact that while the volume was sufficient to satisfy the burgeoning cities for a time, it could not supply and distribute enough clean water to meet the needs of irrigated farming over so vast a region in the long run, nor meet those of its planned industrial growth.61 Oft-mouthed ‘solutions’ like desalination or the piping of water from Tibet or Russia face similar drawbacks: demand is too great for the potential supply and the costs, both financial and environmental, prohibitive. China is already among the world’s most water-stressed nations. The typical Chinese citizen has a ‘water footprint’ of 1071 cubic metres a year – three quarters of the world average (1385 cubic metres), and scarcely a third that of the average American (2842 cubic metres).62 Of this water, 62 per cent is used to grow food to feed the Chinese population – and 90 per cent is so polluted it is unfit to drink or use in food processing. Despite massive investment in water infrastructure and new technology, many experts doubt that China can keep pace with the growth in its demand for food, at least within its own borders, chiefly because of water scarcity.63 Adding to the pressure is that China’s national five-year plans for industrialisation demand massive amounts more water – demands that may confront China with a stark choice between food and economic growth. ‘The Chinese government is moving too slowly towards the Camel Economy. It has plans, incentives for officials; it invests in recycling, irrigation, pollution, drought resistant crops; it leads the world in high voltage transmission (to get hydro, wind and solar energy from the west of China). None of this is sufficient or likely to be in time’, the Financial Times opined.64 As the world’s leading carbon emitter, China is more responsible for climate change than any other country. It is also, potentially, more at risk. The main reason, quite simply, is the impact of a warming world on China’s water supply – in the form of disappearing rivers, lakes, groundwater and mountain glaciers along with rising sea levels. To this is coupled the threat to agriculture from increasing weather disasters and the loss of ecosystem services from a damaged landscape.65 China is thus impaled on the horns of a classic dilemma. Without more water it cannot grow its economy sufficiently to pay for the water-conserving and food-producing technologies and infrastructure it needs to feed its people. Having inadvertently unleashed a population explosion with its highly successful conversion to modern farming systems, the challenge for China now is to somehow sustain its food supply through the population peak of the mid twentyfirst century, followed by a managed decline to maybe half of today’s numbers by the early twentysecond century. It is far from clear whether the present approach – improving market efficiency, continuing to modernise agricultural production systems, pumping water, trying to control soil and water losses and importing more food from overseas – will work.66 China has pinned its main hopes on technology to boost farm yields and improve water distribution and management. Unfortunately, it has selected the unsustainable American industrial farming model to do this – which involves the massive use of water, toxic chemicals, fertilisers, fossil fuels and machines. This in turn is having dreadful consequences for China’s soils, waters, landscapes, food supply, air, climate and consumer health. Serious questions are now being asked whether such an approach is not digging the hole China is in, even deeper. Furthermore, some western analysts are sceptical whether the heavy hand of state control is up to the task of generating the levels of innovation required to feed China sustainably.67 Plan B, which is to purchase food from other countries, or import it from Chinese-owned farming and food ventures around the world, faces similar difficulties. Many of the countries where China is investing in food production themselves face a slow-burning crisis of land degradation, water scarcity, surging populations and swelling local food demand. By exporting its own problems, China is adding to their difficulties. While there may be some truth to the claim that China is helping to modernise food systems in Africa, for example, it is equally clear that the export of food at a time of local shortages could have dire consequences for Africans, leading to wars in Africa and elsewhere. How countries will react to Chinese pressure to export food in the face of their own domestic shortages is, as yet, unclear. If they permit exports, it could prove catastrophic for their own people and governments – but if they cut them off, it could be equally catastrophic for China. Such a situation cannot be regarded as anything other than a menace to world peace. Around 1640, a series of intense droughts caused widespread crop failures in China, leading to unrest and uprisings which, in 1644, brought down the Ming Dynasty. A serious domestic Chinese food and water crisis today – driven by drought, degradation of land and water and climate change in northern China coupled with failure in food imports – could cause a re-run of history: ‘The forthcoming water crisis may impact China’s social, economic, and political stability to a great extent’, a US Intelligence Assessment found. ‘The adverse impacts of climate change will add extra pressure to existing social and resource stresses.’ 68 Such events have the potential to precipitate tens, even hundreds, of millions of emigrants and refugees into countries all over the world, with domino consequences for those countries that receive them. Strategic analysts have speculated that tens of millions of desperate Chinese flooding into eastern Russia, or even India, could lead to war, including the risk of international nuclear exchange.69 Against such a scenario are the plain facts that China is a technologically advanced society, with the foresight, wealth and capacity to plan and implement nationwide changes and the will, if necessary, to enforce them. Its leaders are clearly alert to the food and water challenge – and its resolution may well depend on the extent of water recycling they are able to achieve. As to whether the PRC can afford the cost of transitioning from an unsustainable to a sustainable food system, all countries have a choice between unproductive military spending and feeding their populace. A choice between food or war. It remains to be seen which investment China favours. However, it is vital to understand that the problem of whether China can feed itself through the twentyfirst century is not purely a Chinese problem. It’s a problem, both economic and physical, for the entire planet – and it is thus in everyone’s best interest to help solve it. For this reason, China is rated number 3 on this list of potential food/war hotspots. Africa Food wars – that is, wars in which food, land and water play a significant contributing role – have been a constant in the story of Africa since the mid twentieth century, indeed, far longer. In a sense, the continent is already a microcosm of the world of the twentyfirst century as climate change and resource scarcity combine with rapid population growth to ratchet up the tensions that lead competing groups to fight, whether the superficial distinctions between them are ethnic, religious, social or political. We have examined the particular cases of Rwanda, South Sudan and the Horn of Africa – but there are numerous other African conflicts, insurgencies and ongoing disturbances in which food, land and water are primary or secondary triggers and where famine is often the outcome: Nigeria, Congo, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Mali, Chad, the Central African Republic, the Maghreb region of the Sahara, Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe have all experienced conflicts in which issues of access to food, land and water were important drivers and consequences. The trajectory of Africa’s population in the first two decades of the twentyfirst century implies that the number of its people could quadruple from 1.2 billion in 2017 to 4.5 billion by 2100 (Figure 5.6). If fulfilled, this would make Africans 41 per cent of the world population by the end of the century. The UN Population Division’s nearer projections are for Africans to outnumber Chinese or Indians at 1.7 billion by 2030, and reach 2.5 billion in 2050, which represents a doubling in the continent’s inhabitants in barely 30 years.70 While African fertility rates (babies per woman) remain high by world standards – 4.5 compared with a global average of 2.4 – they have also fallen steeply, from a peak of 8.5 babies in the 1970s. Furthermore, the picture is uneven with birthrates in most Sub-Saharan countries remaining high (around five to six babies/woman), while those of eight, mainly southern, countries have dropped to replacement or below (i.e. under 2.1). As has been the case around the world, birth rates tend to drop rapidly with the spread of urbanisation, education and economic growth – whereas countries which slide back into poverty tend to experience rising birthrates. Food access is a vital ingredient in this dynamic: it has been widely observed that better-fed countries tend to have much lower rates of birth and population growth, possibly because people who are food secure lose fewer infants and children in early life and thus are more open to family planning. So, in a real sense, food sufficiency holds one of the keys to limiting the human population to a level sustainable both for Africa and the planet in general. [Figure omitted] Forecasting the future of Africa is not easy, given the complexity of the interwoven climatic, social, technological and political issues – and many do not attempt it. However, the relentless optimism of the UN and its food agency, the FAO, is probably not justified by the facts as they are known to science – and may have more to do with not wishing to give offence to African governments or discourage donors than with attempting to accurately analyse what may occur. Even the FAO acknowledges however that food insecurity is rising across Sub-Saharan Africa as well as other parts. In 2017, conflict and insecurity were the major drivers of acute food insecurity in 18 countries and territories where almost 74 million food-insecure people were in need of urgent assistance. Eleven of these countries were in Africa and accounted for 37 million acutely food insecure people; the largest numbers were in northern Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and South Sudan the agency said in its Global Report on Food Crises 2018.71 The FAO also noted that almost one in four Africans was undernourished in 2016 – a total of nearly a quarter of a billion people. The rise in undernourishment and food insecurity was linked to the effects of climate change, natural disasters and conflict according to Bukar Tijani, the FAO’s assistant director general for Africa.72 Even the comparatively prosperous nation of South Africa sits on a conflict knife-edge, according to a scientific study: ‘Results indicate that the country exceeds its environmental boundaries for biodiversity loss, marine harvesting, freshwater use, and climate change, and that social deprivation was most severe in the areas of safety, income, and employment, which are significant factors in conflict risk’, Megan Cole and colleagues found.73 In the Congo, home to the world’s second largest tropical forest, 20 years of civil war had not only slain five million civilians but also decimated the forests and their ecological services on which the nation depended. Researchers found evidence that reducing conflict can also help to reduce environmental destruction: ‘Peace-building can potentially be a win for nature as well, and... conservation organizations and governments should be ready to seize conservation opportunities’. 74 As the African population doubles toward the mid century, as its water, soils, forests and economic wealth per capita dwindle, as foreign corporations plunder its riches, as a turbulent climate hammers its herders and farmers – both industrial and traditional – the prospect of Africa resolving existing conflicts and avoiding new ones is receding. The mistake most of the world is making is to imagine this only affects the Africans. The consequences will impact everyone on the planet. A World Bank study has warned that 140 million people will have to leave just three regions of the world as climate refugees before 2050 – and the vast majority of these, some 86 million, would be displaced from their homes in Sub-Saharan Africa.75 The second decade of the twentyfirst century has already witnessed a blow-out in the number of Sub-Saharan Africans fleeing north, across the desert into the already dangerously overstressed region of North Africa. From there many have headed by boat for Europe, with shocking loss of life on the way – up to 5000 deaths due to drowning in a single year. The number of Africans fleeing across the Mediterranean has fluctuated, climbing as high as a third of a million people (in 2016) with most of them headed for Italy, followed by Greece, Cyprus and Spain. By this time Europe already had a population of five million Sub-Saharans.76 It is worth recalling, for a moment, that a food failure in the North African grainbowl in the third and fourth centuries was a primary factor in the collapse and demolition of the Roman Empire, from Britain to Asia Minor. The risk of a tsunami of people attempting to escape Africa for Europe, and to a lesser degree the Middle East, in coming decades is building with ominous intensity. The stress in SubSaharan Africa is already forcing conditions in North African countries closer to crisis point. Were their food systems to fail in domino-succession, the scale of potential movement of desperate people into Europe can only be guessed – but is certainly in the range of tens to hundreds of millions. Large enough, in other words, to swamp the nations of Italy, Spain and Greece and eliminate their governments altogether, forcing many of their own people in turn to flee into northern Europe. Given the crisis caused by a million Syrians fleeing into Europe in 2013, the consequences for European stability and the world economy of an African eruption tens or hundreds of times the size can only be imagined. The good news is that, in the view of the World Bank, up to 80 per cent of Africa’s climate refugees could be prevented from leaving their homes in the first place by timely climate and development (i.e. food, land and water) action taken by the rest of the world. The bad news, however, is that most of the world’s large oil and coal companies and their climate-denying puppet governments remain implacably opposed to the sort and scale of action necessary, preferring to pull the global house down on their own heads. Canadian ecologist Paul Chefurka argued in a far-sighted paper that the outlook for Africa by 2040 was grim, even if the continent were able to lock in a 1 per cent year-on-year increase in farm yields. Even then Africa might still be forced to spend half its wealth – an almost impossible proportion – on food imports by 2050, assuming sufficient affordable food was available globally to supply them. Chefurka argued the solutions were: First, the developed world must get its act together when it comes to foreign aid. Our lack of performance with regard to the Millennium Development Goals is beyond contemptible. A minuscule sliver of the GDP of the richest nations could help prevent a catastrophic outcome for hundreds of millions of people and scores of countries. That we have failed our African brothers and sisters so egregiously is a shame that should follow all of us into the afterlife. Second, and most importantly, we must develop an immediate crash program of education and contraception in all the regions at risk from this gathering storm. Africa may be the first, but the conditions are ripe for much of South Asia to follow in their footsteps. We must blanket Africa with schools and family planning clinics.77 There is substance to both points. Unfortunately expanding conventional farming with a view to feeding all the Africans in 2050 and 2100 is unlikely to succeed. It is a twentieth-century solution to a twentyfirst-century problem, even with more advanced farming technologies added. It would unleash cataclysmic soil and water loss, gross pollution, the spread of deserts and animal, plant and human diseases, accelerate climate change (through land clearing and the use of fossil fuels and fertilisers) and extinguish the last of Africa’s wildlife. The combined outcome of this would be war, potentially on a continent-wide scale – and it is for this reason Africa ranks second on this list of world food and war hotspots. Where the true solutions to Africa’s and the world’s food challenges may lie is dealt with in the concluding chapters of this book. South Asia The constellation of burgeoning food demand, water scarcity, degrading land, a turbulent climate, social, political and religious feuding and rampant militarisation make the region of South Asia – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka – the most dangerous of all for civilisation during the twentyfirst century. The population of the region has more than tripled since the 1960s. India alone is looking at a population of 1.73 billion by 2050, Pakistan at 306 million, Bangladesh 202 million and Sri Lanka at 23 million – a combined total approaching 2.3 billion.78 The Indo-Gangetic Plain is the bread-basket of the three largest countries and currently feeds more than 900 million from both surface and groundwater. ‘India is facing a perfect storm in managing water. Centuries of mismanagement, political and institutional incompetence, indifference at central, state and municipal levels, a steadily increasing population that will reach an estimated 1.7 billion by 2050, a rapidly mushrooming middle class demanding an increasingly protein-rich diet that requires significantly more water to produce – together, these are leading the country towards disaster', says Professor Asit Biswas of the National University of Singapore.79 ‘India is now facing a water situation that is significantly worse than any that previous generations have had to face. All Indian water bodies within and near population centres are now grossly polluted... Not a single Indian city can provide clean water that can be consumed from the tap on a 24x7 basis’, he adds. This was underlined by a warning from the Indian Supreme Court in 2018 that the capital, New Delhi – population 25 million – was on track to run out of groundwater completely.80 Facing similar water scarcity were 20 other Indian cities, including Bangalore and Hyderabad – heartbeat of the Indian high-tech boom – menacing the lives and jobs of 600 million Indians.81 Free electricity and cheap diesel pumps led to an explosion in the extraction of groundwater across the Indo-Gangetic plain. ‘The best estimate is that at present India uses 230–250 cubic kilometres of groundwater each year. This accounts for about one-quarter of the global groundwater use. More than 60% of irrigated agriculture and 85% of domestic water use now depends on groundwater.’ Over large areas, India’s groundwater levels have been falling precipitously, in places at rates of a metre or more a year, since the start of the twentyfirst century and scientists fear its reserves will be largely exhausted by 2050.82 The World Resources Institute, which keeps a hawk-like gaze on global water issues, notes that more than half of India is already water stressed, affecting more than 600 million people – and the situation will become extremely grave towards 2040 (Figure 5.7).83 Climate change is only making matters worse for South Asia – the rising intensity of droughts, floods and heatwaves threatens to undermine the region’s fragile ability to feed itself. Indeed, according to some projections, parts will be so hot as to become uninhabitable and unfarmable.84 Recent climate modelling identified India as the world’s second most vulnerable country for climate-related hunger, and Bangladesh third, with the situation worsening towards 2 C of global warming.85 The Indian Ministry of Finance concurs, warning that climate could shrink agricultural incomes by as much as 25 per cent in unirrigated farmland and 18 per cent in irrigated areas by 2100.86 [Figure omitted] South Asia’s main water reserve, the glacial ice of the Hindu Kush and Himalaya which supports two billion people, is in dire straits, according to a study by 210 scientists. A third of it will be gone by 2100, in a ‘climate crisis you haven’t heard of’, said lead author Philippus Wester. Its loss due to global warming holds catastrophic consequences for rivers, groundwater, food production and the cities that rely on it.87 ‘Climate change is likely to have a detrimental effect on South Asia out to 2030 and beyond, mainly because of its ability to exacerbate one of South Asia’s biggest challenges: an expanding population and the challenge of feeding, housing, clothing, watering and employing it’, wrote analyst Benjamin Walsh.88 Melting glaciers, increased evaporation and swelling cities are all intensifying existing food and water insecurity and, since climate change cannot be prevented in the short run, governments had better prepare for it, he said. In this sense, Walsh and Biswas tender similar advice: whether or not South Asia can ride out the ‘perfect storm’ will depend on the competence and determination of hitherto somewhat inept governments in taking the essential steps to conserve water and find new ways to produce food. The subcontinent’s existing food and water model is broken and cannot survive the mid century. On the positive side is the enthusiasm with which South Asia has embraced renewable energy and the IT revolution, expressed in the region’s strong economic growth. These demonstrate that vast and rapid national and regional changes are possible. Water, land and food, however, present far more intractable problems – social, political and technical – on which age-old disputes over religion, ethnicity and caste lie like a pall. Since India and Pakistan partitioned in 1947, there has been ongoing low-level conflict over the waters of the Indus and the territory of Kashmir. Pakistan considers India is stealing its water and trying to assert hegemony through dam-building, while India claims Pakistan is losing water due to climate change: the scarcer water becomes for either country, the more the tensions escalate. Both sides are heavily armed: India has 2.1 million soldiers under arms, and Pakistan 644,000. Both nations have 120+ nuclear warheads. Between them, they spend US$65 billion a year on their militaries.89 How close they have been to open war is highlighted by legal expert Dr Waseem Quereshi: ‘The tension over water conflicts between India and Pakistan has been soaring. India has threatened that it will scrap the IWT [Indus Waters Treaty] entirely. In response, Pakistan has stated that such a revocation of a bilaterally agreed treaty would be considered an act of war’. 90 Large-scale food, land and water failures anywhere on the Indian subcontinent could spark immense refugee movements in the tens or hundreds of millions, capable of obliterating neighbour countries and igniting wars. They are liable to be on a scale that dwarfs the Syrian refugee problem into insignificance, with worldwide repercussions. For example, some 130 million people on the subcontinent inhabit low-lying coastal regions that will be under the sea by 210091, and that is but a single dimension of the climate–water crisis. The World Bank rates the Indian subcontinent the world’s second most vulnerable region for enforced climate migration, with 40 million climate refugees alone in India by 2050.92 These estimates take no account of the scale of migration that could result from major failures in food or water, or people fleeing resulting conflicts. The scenario of major collapse in the South Asian food and water system is so appalling that no government or agency, as yet, seems prepared even to contemplate its possibility, or to risk the displeasure of South Asian governments and peoples by speaking openly about it. As a result, the world at large is doing little to forestall or prevent it. However, for whatever the vox populi is worth, when the website Debate.org asked readers to vote on the question “Will India Collapse?”, 76 per cent of respondents (mostly Indians) were of the view that it would.93 The Oslo Peace Research Institute, in a rather more structured attempt to predict the likelihood of future conflicts based on past behaviour, rated Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka among the countries more likely to face wars up to 2050.94 The great issue for humanity is South Asia’s combined arsenal of 250+ nuclear weapons. Though many of these are thought to be ‘battlefield’ or tactical nukes (as opposed to city busters), there are enough of them to cause a worldwide famine affecting everybody and lasting several years. This insight arises out of the increasing sophistication of global climate models, which can now describe the impact of nuclear release on the global climate system with far greater precision than ever before. Meteorologist Alan Robock from Rutgers University and physicist Brian Toon from the University of Colorado have devoted 30 years to projecting the effects of nuclear war. They estimate that a limited nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would throw up at least five million tonnes of dust and smoke from burning forests and incinerated cities, lofting it into the high atmosphere where it will linger for up to 20 years. In climatic terms, this would be the equivalent of an asteroid impact on Earth or a large volcanic eruption, they said – enough to unleash a worldwide ‘nuclear winter’. 95 ‘We put it into a NASA climate model and found it would be the largest climate change in recorded human history’, Brian Toon told a journalist. ‘The basic physics is very simple. If you block out the Sun, it gets cold and dark at the Earth’s surface’. 96 He continued: ‘We hypothesized that if each country used half of their nuclear arsenal, that would be 50 weapons on each side. We assumed the simplest bomb, which is the size dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – a 15 kiloton bomb. The answer is the global average temperature would go down by about 1.5 degrees Celsius. In the middle of continents, temperature drops would be larger and last for a decade or more’. The effects of this snap cooling on agriculture worldwide were then calculated. The answer was equally chilling: harvests would crash by 20–40 per cent for five years, and for the next five years, linger 10–20 per cent below the pre-war norm. This would result in malnourishment, if not outright starvation, for most of the world’s population (Figure 5.8).

Diagram, engineering drawing

Description automatically generated

Such an event would be more severe than the Little Ice Age of the eighteenth century – which was, it may be recalled, a likely contributing factor in the hunger that led to the French Revolution – or the cool period that brought down the Roman Empire in the fourth century. In today’s overcrowded world it would unleash global hunger, reducing the average daily caloric intake from 2900 to 1900–2000 calories or fewer, which is borderline malnutrition. For people already hungry, such an outcome would be fatal. Yet that is not the worst of it. A report by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) concluded that China, lying immediately downwind of India/Pakistan, would be worst affected by the nuclear winter effects of even a limited atomic war in South Asia. Chinese winter wheat production would fall by up to half, and the rice crop by 21 per cent. Two billion people in India and China would starve within months, government in both countries would probably disintegrate and, in an echo of their own and Roman histories, the remnants of society would doubtless be riven among local warlords. Most of the nations of Southeast, West, North and Central Asia on their borders would be swept away before the tide of people fleeing the catastrophe.97 How such events would play out for the rest of the world are not easy to predict – but, in all likelihood, the panic occasioned by rising global hunger, soaring global food prices and the loss of two of its largest traders would crash the world economy, toppling more governments and igniting further civil and international conflict, some of it potentially nuclear. Thus, even a relatively limited nuclear exchange, such as between India and Pakistan, could bring civilisation as we know it to an end. From this brief assessment it can be seen that the Indian subcontinent, more than any region on Earth, holds the key to the future of world food security and hence, the fate of civilisation in this century. For this reason, the South Asian region is rated as the Number One Risk on this list, in terms of food, land and water insecurity and conflict risk, above all others. The Human Tide Since lack of food, or fear of it, is a primary motive for people to leave their homes, the number of refugees and displaced people worldwide offers stark testimony to the increasing pressures facing human civilisation and its food supply, as we bang up against the finite limits of the planet we inhabit. The actual number of refugees and internally displaced people more than doubled in the first two decades of the twentyfirst century, from 32 million in the late 1990s to 68.5 million in 2018.98 Furthermore, the proportion of the world population in flight rose nearly tenfold, from 0.1 per cent to almost 1 per cent, meaning – as the World Economic Forum pointed out – that around one person in every hundred has fled their home.99 In 2018, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees noted these were ‘the highest levels of displacement on record’, that nearly half of all refugees were children under 18 and that, on average, 20 people were being displaced every minute. On top of this the UN reported 258 million ‘economic migrants’ in 2017,100 mostly from Asia and mainly educated people who had foreseen potential trouble in their homelands, including China and India, and had the resources to move themselves and their families out of harm’s way and to other more secure parts of the globe. Together, then, almost a third of a billion human beings now roam the planet every year in search of new homes and opportunities, freedom from war or hunger. Such a vast number of people already on the road – equivalent to the entire population of the USA – gives some inkling of the colossal people movements which could eventuate from large scale conflicts over food, land and water as the century advances. It is time to face the fact that movements of a billion humans or more are now entirely possible over a comparatively short time – even though many may die in the process. In case anyone should consider such vast movements to be impossible, the World Bank notes that the number of global tourists alone already exceeds 1.25 billion a year – which simply goes to illustrate the capacity of modern transport systems.101 Most of those tourists travel by air, road, rail or passenger vessel – however, it should be noted the world also has 52,000 merchant ships, 312,000 general aviation aircraft, 4.6 million fishing boats and tens of millions of larger recreational craft102 capable of being commandeered by fleeing people, should their needs be fierce enough. As mentioned before, the Bank anticipated that at least 140 million ‘climate refugees’ may be forced to quit just three highly vulnerable regions by the mid twentyfirst century: SubSaharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America.103 In the Bank’s analysis, the main drivers for these immigrants, it should be noted, are factors such as water scarcity, crop failure, sea-level rise and storm surges – not the wars these impacts may also ignite. They would make the exodus much larger. Furthermore, the Bank’s analysis does not include other at-risk regions such as China, Central Asia and the Middle East/North Africa. The FAO, in its report on the state of world food security,104 commented as follows. ‘The number of conflicts is... on the rise. Exacerbated by climate-related shocks, conflicts seriously affect food security and are a cause of much of the recent increase in food insecurity.’ ‘Conflict is a key driver of situations of severe food crisis and recently re-emerged famines, while hunger and undernutrition are significantly worse where conflicts are prolonged and institutional capacities weak.’ It is important to understand that such disasters are preventable, with sufficient forward recognition of the driving factors, early implementation of suitable preventative strategies and with the co-operation of the global community. At present this cooperation is fragmentary, and few countries feel responsible for preventing the kinds of events described in this chapter, especially those taking place in distant, overseas countries. Yet it is increasingly in their own interests to do so, in view of unavoidable consequences for themselves, both physical and economic. In the twentyfirst century the risk of mass migration and conflict driven by insecurity of food, land and water is higher than in any previous age of human history. The World Economic Forum (WEF) rated enforced mass migration as the sixth most likely of its top 30 global risks in 2018 and the second worst in terms of its societal impact. It identified ‘profound social instability’ as the risk factor most highly connected to the prevailing range of global trends.105 Furthermore, the ominous and destabilising rise of right-wing populism and renascent fascism in western countries, especially, is in part a direct response to rising fears of mass immigration.106 Eight out of the WEF’s top ten risks of 2018 related to global food security. Furthermore, the World Food Programme (WFP), in its report At the Root of Exodus: Food Security, Conflict and International Migration, drew a direct line between food, war and mass migration: ‘The WFP study found that countries with the highest level of food insecurity, coupled with armed conflict, have the highest outward migration of refugees. Additionally, when coupled with poverty, food insecurity increases the likelihood and intensity of armed conflicts; something that has clear implications for refugee outflows’, it said.107 Food, land and water must therefore now be viewed as strategic components of defence and international security as elemental as naval fleets, air power, armies or weapons. There is no logic to arming ourselves against the possibility of global conflict if, by ignoring its causes, we inadvertently set in motion the very machinery that drives it. Neglecting the strategic importance of food, land and water will deliver increased risk of war and mass migration – while the opposite is also true: attending to them can yield a vital peace dividend by extinguishing or damping down an important casus belli. This issue is developed in Chapter 7.

#### 2 — there is no internal link — US exports don’t go to countries that need the food

Holobar 16 — Krista Holobar, Agroecology and Food Policy Writer at *Civil Eats*—a food policy publication, 2016 (“Does Big Ag Really Feed the World? New Data Says Not So Much,” *Civil Eats*, October 5th, Available Online at <https://civileats.com/2016/10/05/does-big-ag-really-feed-the-world/>, Accessed 10-12-2018)

Ever since the U.N. announced that the world population is projected to exceed 9 billion by 2050 and global food production will have to more than double by that time, U.S. agricultural and agribusiness interests have been making the case that America’s farmers will have to double their production of grain and meat to “feed the world.” Those who make this argument maintain that industrial farming—which relies heavily on biotechnology and pesticides—is the only way U.S. farmers can double production, while organic and other agroecological methods will only put countless people at risk of hunger and malnutrition. But new data compiled by Environmental Working Group (EWG) makes it clear that we’re not really feeding the parts of the world that need it. In reality, most agricultural exports from the U.S. go to countries whose citizens can afford to pay for them. Our top five export destinations are Canada, China, Mexico, the European Union, and Japan—all countries with “high” or “very high” UN development scores and “very low” or “moderately low” Food and Agriculture Organization hunger scores. In 2015, less than one percent of America’s agricultural exports went to the 19 countries with the highest level of undernourishment, while exports to the top 20 destinations were 158 times greater. And over the last decade, the value of U.S. agricultural exports to the countries with very high or high undernourishment averaged only 0.7 [point seven] percent of the value of total agricultural exports.

#### 3 — Food insecurity leads to protests that decrease the risk of interstate war

Barrett ’13 (Christopher B. Barrett – Deputy Dean and Dean of Academic Affairs of the College of Business, Stephen B. and Janice G. Ashley Professor of Applied Economics and Management, and an International Professor of Agriculture, all at the Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, as well as a Professor in the Department of Economics and a Fellow of the David R. Atkinson Center for a Sustainable Future, all at Cornell University, “Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability,” 26 September 2013, Google Books)

The simplest definition of sociopolitical stability is the absence of coordinated human activities that cause widespread disruption of daily life for local populations. Note that this excludes violent personal crimes, such as murder, and natural disasters. But this definition encompasses a continuum of activities that we can array according to the magnitude of their human consequences, from nonviolent riots or large-scale political protests and work stoppages at one end, through violent versions of such organized actions, to guerilla movements and terrorism by state and non-state actors, to outright civil war, and finally to interstate war at the other. Boulding (1978) defined peace as the absence of war and emphasized that peace does not require the resolution of all conflicts within or among nations, merely that such conflict remain nonviolent. As used here and in the rest of this volume, stability is an even more Utopian state than mere peace. For example, many of the food riots of the past several years proved extremely disruptive to the populations affected—and threatening to governments—but did not turn violent, at least in the sense of causing deaths. We consider such events moments of instability, even though peace prevailed.

This sort of hierarchical ordering is instructive, as it underscores two fundamental points made directly or indirectly by multiple contributors to this volume. First, not all instability is bad. When peaceful, structured, political, legal, and economic conflict occurs where the probability of large-scale conflict is negligible, mobilization against state policy is not automatically negative. Indeed, nonviolent social protest movements can be important forces for productive change. Social movements often push states to adopt policies that ultimately enhance both food security and sociopolitical stability by offering some redress for longstanding structural grievances that might otherwise lead to violence, even war.

This leads directly to the second fundamental point: the greatest dangers come not from lower-level instability associated with protests, riots, and work stoppages, but rather from violence at scale, especially in the form of organized civil or interstate war. Preserving peace is far more important, in human, economic, and geostrategic terms, than is maintaining stability. Indeed, a certain level of nonviolent instability can help to secure a stable peace if it compels the state to take actions that preempt the intensification and spread of deeper structural grievances—actions it would not choose without pressure. Riots are dangerous to local populations primarily insofar as they enable an opposition to build larger, more durable coalitions for violent political struggle against a regime. State and private actions can defuse more threatening and dangerous guerilla movements, terrorism, and civil or interstate war. Underappreciation of the central place of preventive and responsive action in mediating the relationship between food security and sociopolitical stability is perhaps the greatest deficiency of recent debates, which tend to treat the sociopolitical risks of food insecurity as driven largely by exogenous forcing variables such as climate or global market prices.

### 1NC — AT: Consolidation

#### Merger restrictions don’t stop agricultural consolidation

James M. MacDonald 1, Economic Research Service, USDA; and Marvin L. Hayenga, Iowa State University, 2001, “Concentration, Mergers, and Antitrust Policy,” https://afpc.tamu.edu/research/publications/263/macdonald.pdf

Agribusiness mergers are one strategy for large firms, and they could respond to a ban with other strategic steps. Those seeking scale economies could grow internally by building bigger facilities instead of merging. Because firms have that alternative, a merger prohibition will not necessarily halt increases in concentration based on scale economies. Second, firms could respond to a prohibition on the purchase of large agribusiness firms by purchasing other large firms in the economy and becoming conglomerates. Such moves might be particularly inefficient (cost-raising).

## 1NC — Bargaining Power

### 1NC — AT: Co-ops

#### There is a singular card that makes this an advantage:

#### a. says Capper-Volstead eroding now—solves their internals

#### b. but explicitly says steps to erode are bad—KU YELLOW

Barnes and Levine 21, Donald, JD from George Washington University; JD from Fordham University, and former Vice-Chair of the ABA Antitrust Section’s Joint Conduct Committee; Jay, co-chair of the Porter Wright Morris & Arthur Antitrust and Consumer Protection Practice Group, “Farmer Cooperatives "Take Cover": The Capper-Volstead Exemption is Under Siege”. Arkansas Law Review, Volume 74, Number 1. April 2021, Accessed 11/10/21, https://scholarworks.uark.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=alrAH

IV. BARGAINING POWER–THEN AND NOW The question can fairly be asked: Has the Capper-Volstead Act outlived its usefulness? After all, many agricultural cooperatives are big businesses nowadays.165 Indeed, plaintiffs in the cases challenging the application of the Capper-Volstead Act make this argument, both implicitly and explicitly.166 The fact remains that agriculture is different from other industries. Production of agricultural products has a far longer lead time than its manufactured counterparts, due to the need for planting and harvesting, in the case of crops, or birthing and rearing animals, in the case of livestock.167 Additionally, Mother Nature, always a fickle variable, plays a huge role in the success or failure of any year’s yield. And, of course, these products are generally perishable. Given that these products form the very basis of the foodstuffs we consume daily, agriculture has always enjoyed special legislative protection. Nevertheless, it was the imbalance in bargaining power between the buyers of the agricultural products and the individual farmers who produced them that spurred the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act. And, though agricultural producers have grown in size, so have their customers, resulting in the same relative imbalance today. In the early 1920s, when the Capper-Volstead Act was under consideration, there were approximately 6,448,000 farms in the United States.168 These were small farms that often found themselves at the mercy of middlemen and buyers due to a lack of bargaining power and the perishable nature of their products.169 As farm prices became depressed, farmers were abandoning their farms to move to cities. Consumers and legislators were concerned about potential food shortages. The power of the buyers over the individual farmers impelled the passage of the Act.170 The modern era has been marked by the consolidation of buyers and farm units alike. As the Department of Justice was conducting a series of workshops into antitrust issues affecting agriculture, food retail, and processing companies continued along a path of rapid consolidation.171 By 2009, the top food retailers—Wal-Mart, Kroger, Costco, and Supervalu—controlled more than half of all grocery sales in the United States.172 Consolidation has thus given top retailers considerable purchasing power as wholesale buyers of groceries, and many food-processing firms justify their mergers as an effort to create stronger bargaining power with these large retailers.173 The number of farmers has declined by over two-thirds, from nearly 6.5 million in the 1920s, to 2.06 million in 2016.174 At the same time, cooperatives have consolidated into larger units and their customers have become national and international enterprises.175 In 2010, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and Department of Justice held a series of workshops (“Workshops”) around the country entitled “Exploring Competition Issues in Agriculture.”176 At the June 25, 2010 Workshop in Madison, Wisconsin, Robert Cropp, Professor Emeritus of Agriculture and Applied Science at the University of Wisconsin, presented data indicating that the bargaining power imbalance that the Capper Volstead Act was designed to correct is just as prevalent today, if not more so.177 For example, in 2010, Wal-Mart topped the Fortune 500 list with food revenues of approximately $230 billion.178 By contrast, total revenue of all dairy cooperatives in the country was less than $40 billion, with the largest dairy cooperative having sales of $10 billion.179 In 2010, the largest agricultural cooperative, CHS, Inc., had revenues of $26 billion.180 A number of their customers are on the Fortune 500 list, including Kroger, SuperValu, and Kraft. Each of these entities have revenues that are large multiples of those of the largest cooperatives.181 Furthermore, there has been a great deal of consolidation in the retail grocery industry. Progressive Grocer’s Super 50 list of the largest grocery chains does not include membership clubs such as Sam’s, Costco, and BJ’s.182 Yet, as reported in May 2018, the combined annual sales of the Super 50 grocers still tops $580 billion.183 The top ten, which includes Wal-Mart, Kroger, and Safeway, accounts for more than seventy-seven percent of those sales, or approximately $450 billion.184 Similarly, Associated Wholesale Grocers, a buying group not even included in the Super 50, had revenues of approximately $9.2 billion in 2016.185 In comparison, according to a study by the USDA, combined revenues of all United States agricultural cooperatives topped $212 billion and the one hundred largest agricultural cooperatives in the United States reported combined revenues of $146 billion in 2015—a fraction of the combined revenue of just the top ten retail grocers.186 Just as they were ninety-nine years ago, today’s farmers are still confronted with the disproportionate bargaining power of their huge customers. 187 Consequently, the very conditions that compelled passage of the Capper-Volstead Act back in 1922 prevail today. V. IMPACT ON FOREIGN LAW The United States is not the only country to have adopted an agricultural policy designed to afford certain protection to farmers; under the European Union’s common agricultural policy, certain behavior and practices by agricultural producer organizations, which might otherwise be considered as anticompetitive, are excluded from the scope of the European Union’s competition rules.188 It is not surprising, therefore, that current attempts to undermine and weaken the American farmers’ antitrust exemption could easily have international implications. Numerous foreign countries already use the United States’ antitrust law as a model, and several have adopted antitrust exemptions for agricultural cooperatives similar to the Capper Volstead Act.189 [Begin Footnote 189] 189. For example, Japan’s Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947, following the example of the Capper-Volstead Act, exempts certain agricultural cooperatives from its application. See Hiroshi Ashino, Experimenting with Anti-Trust Law in Japan, 3 JAPANESE ANN. INT’L L. 31, 31 (1959); Hiroshi Iyori, A Comparison of U.S.-Japan Antitrust Law: Looking at the International Harmonization of Competition Law, 4 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 66 (1995). Agricultural cooperatives in Europe are similarly exempted from liability under Article 81 of the European Community (“EC”) Treaty—Europe’s analog to the Sherman Act—by Regulation 26, adopted by the EC Council in 1962. Arie Reich, The Agricultural Exemption in Antitrust Law: A Comparative Look at the Political Economy of Market Regulation, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 843, 849-50 (2007). The United Kingdom’s Competition Act of 1998 contains an exemption for agricultural cooperatives patterned on the EC’s Regulation 26. Id. at 856. And Israel, which regulates competition under its Restrictive Trade Practices Law of 1988, provides an exemption to agricultural cooperatives under Article 3(4) of that Law. Id. at 857-58. [End Footnote 189] Farmers in developing economies have faced or will eventually face the same challenges as those that confronted American farmers at the time the Capper-Volstead Act was passed.190 They deserve the same protection. Their governments could easily adopt restrictive rulings from United States courts,191 which could keep their farmers from achieving effective collective bargaining power. [Begin Footnote 191] 191. Indeed, foreign courts often find U.S. case law instructive in interpreting their own antitrust laws. See, e.g., Rural Press Ltd. v Australian Competition and Consumer Comm’n, (2003) 216 CLR 53, 88 (Austl.) (holding market-sharing arrangements per se invalid under the Australian Trade Practices Act, citing favorably to United States case-law holding such arrangements to be per se violations of the Sherman Act); R. v. Bugden’s Taxi [End Footnote 191] International efforts have been underway to aid the development of farmer cooperatives and the laws that protect their activities. In a May 2012 report, the European Competition Network (“ECN”) noted concerns about price volatility and competitiveness in food production and distribution.192 Some national competition authorities believe that cooperation among producers and the creation of cooperatives would increase competition in the food sector.193 By 2013 these concerns led to the European Union’s adoption of significant reforms to its Common Agricultural Policy (the “CAP”) that set new rules for allowing joint-selling by producers in the agricultural sector.194 In November 2015, the European Commission adopted guidelines on potential competition issues arising in the implementation of these new rules as they pertain to the olive oil, beef and veal, and arable crops sectors.195 CAP reform removed production restraints to encourage farmers to base their production decisions on market signals.196 The legal framework under CAP reform also “extend[ed] the possibility for collective bargaining (in some [agricultural] sectors) and delivery contracts (for all [agricultural] sectors) to [p]roducer [o]rganisations, their [a]ssociations and Inter Branch Organisations.”197 The U.S. Overseas Cooperative Development Council (funded by USAID) is conducting a major initiative called the “Cooperative Law and Regulation Initiative” (“CLARITY”).198 Part of that initiative involves providing assistance to help national cooperative movements organize themselves, and helping to evaluate and improve their cooperative laws.199 CLARITY points to the Capper-Volstead Act as an exemplar for implementing exemptions from competition law that would otherwise prohibit certain joint action between businesses for cooperatives.200 VI. CONCLUSION The more things change, the more they stay the same. As true now as it was in the 1920s, the number of farms continues to decline. Farmers and their cooperatives are still at the mercy of power buyers, Mother Nature, and the international marketplace. There is still a large imbalance of bargaining power. In short, the same conditions and concerns that existed at the time the Capper Volstead Act was passed continue to this day. As the Supreme Court stated in Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Association v. United States: We believe it is reasonably clear from the very language of the Capper-Volstead Act, as it was in § 6 of the Clayton Act, that the general philosophy of both was simply that individual farmers should be given, through agricultural cooperatives acting as entities, the same unified competitive advantage–and responsibility–available to businessmen acting through corporations as entities.201 That rationale continues to apply today. Nevertheless, power buyers and other opportunistic interests continue to enlist the courts in eroding the basic foundations of the exemption, and the implications will have far reaching effects. The bargaining power and economic viability of farmers and their cooperatives will be undermined here and abroad as foreign governments and their courts follow the lead of the United States. Aggressive legal attacks on the very foundations of cooperatives themselves are being waged and hope now rests with the higher courts or Congress.

### 1NC — AT: Democratic

#### There is no way to determine if something is “undemocratic”

Lieblich 16 (Eliav Lieblich-Assistant Professor, Radzyner Law School, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya. J.S.D., Columbia Law School. ARTICLE: Internal Jus ad Bellum, 67 Hastings L.J. 687, 689. April, 2016. Lexis accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 1/6/22)

Beyond the theoretical legal aspects above, there are additional practical reasons to reject democracy as the ultimate yardstick to assess internal resort to force both by states and opposition movements. The first is the likely objection that the term democracy might be understood as implying Western hegemony. 199 This in itself can irreparably harm the concept's legitimacy. Furthermore, even orthodox liberal theory recognizes that nowadays the democracy and authoritarianism dichotomy is too simplistic when constructing international relations, and that some gray areas of legitimacy exist - most notably in the form of the Rawlsian idea of "decent peoples." 200 But even if we reject such gray areas, the conceptual ambiguity of democracy remains. Indeed, defining democracy is far from simple, even if we can agree on its basic tenets. 201 As the world is abundant with "flawed" democracies, 202 it is not always clear when the threshold is crossed. History teaches us to be suspicious concerning the use of the term "democratic" as an empty vessel. 203 Since any rule on the use of force - considering the stakes at hand - must aim to minimize the space for subjective interpretation, it should not be constructed around vague concepts.

### 1NC — AT: Terrorism

#### Safe havens mean nothing for terrorist groups — they can still mobilize

Pillar 20, nonresident senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies. (Paul R., 5-13-2020, "The American Perception of Substate Threats", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/american-perception-substate-threats)

The other customary worry about terrorist havens concerns not what any new regime would tolerate, but instead how terrorists would exploit disorder and lawlessness to establish such a haven. The group does what it wants to do, in other words, because the chaos of domestic conflict places it beyond the reach of any regime, domestic or foreign. That scenario presents somewhat more basis for concern because it does not postulate regimes getting into the terrorist business against their own interests, but it suffers from two other limitations. One is that although a little bit of disorder may help keep a terrorist group beyond the reach of law and government, a lot of disorder does not often help it. Terrorist organizations find it hard to operate in truly chaotic situations for the same general reasons legitimate businesses and other organizations find it hard to operate in such situations. That is why al Qaeda did not make as many inroads in Somalia as many predicted during the two decades that country was the archetypical chaotic failed state.

A second limitation is that terrorist safe havens are, quite simply, overrated. They may seize our attention as a spatially satisfying way of keeping score of how we are doing against any adversary that, like the United States, operates internationally. Among all the variables that help determine how much of a threat any one group represents, however, having a small patch of real estate is not one of the more important ones. That is all the more the case in an era of globalization and globe‐​spanning information technology in which planning, recruitment, and the direction of operations take place at least as much in virtual space as they do in physical space.19 When physical space is involved in a terrorist threat to U.S. interests, it is at least as likely to be in an apartment or mosque in a Western city (or a flight school in the United States) as on a piece of ground in some strife‐​riven land outside the West. Preparation of the most famous terrorist operation of all—9/11—is a prime example.

# 2NC

CP — Conditions

**Prohibit means to forbid a given practice---that’s distinct from restriction.**

**Kennard 93** – Judge, California Supreme Court

Joyce L. Kennard, dissenting opinion in THEODORE R. HOWARD et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GEORGE H. BABCOCK et al., Defendants and Respondents. No. S027061., Supreme Court of California, 1993, https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/6/409.html

As I pointed out earlier, the majority's conclusion is at odds with the great weight of authority. Also, in determining reasonableness based on the relationship between or among attorneys, the majority gives little regard to the relationship between the attorney and the client. Moreover, the majority fails to recognize that restrictive covenants are intended to and do restrict the practice of law. Rule 1-500 proscribes agreements that "restrict" the practice of law, not just those that prohibit "altogether" the practice of law. (Contra, Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 963, 969 [285 Cal.Rptr. 845] [rule 1-500 "simply provides that an attorney may not enter into an agreement to refrain altogether from the practice of law"].) To "restrict" means to restrain, to confine within bounds. (Webster's New Collegiate Dict. (9th ed. 1988) p. 1006.) To "**prohibit**" means to **prevent**, to [\*\*164] [\*\*\*94] **forbid**. (Id. at p. 940.) **The terms are not synonymous**.

#### Prohibition means practices are never allowed—restrictions carve out exceptions

South African Revenue Service, 2021 (“Prohibited, restricted and counterfeit goods,” <https://www.sars.gov.za/customs-and-excise/prohibited-restricted-and-counterfeit-goods/>, last updated: 25 August 2021)

The main difference between prohibitions and restrictions is that:

prohibited goods are never allowed to enter or exit South Africa under any circumstances

restricted goods are allowed to enter or exit South Africa only in certain circumstances or under certain conditions, for example on production of a permit, certificate or letter of authority from the relevant government department, institution or body.

SARS administers certain prohibitions or restrictions in terms of section 113(8)(a) of the Customs and Excise Act, 1964 on behalf of a number of government departments, institutions or bodies, for example the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, National Regulator for Compulsory Specifications (NRCS), the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), to name a few.

#### That’s true for antitrust

Hawk 14—(Adjunct Professor of Law at Fordham University). Barry E. Hawk. 2014. “Competitor Agreements Under Brazilian Law”. Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute. Juris Publishing. <https://books.google.com/books?id=bnrKAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>. Accessed 9/6/21.

I do agree with those who have highlighted the difference between a per se prohibition in the U.S. law and the restriction by object in the European and national law: the latter allows an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.

#### Within antitrust, restrictions are a small subset of a prohibition

Nili 20 (Yaron Nili-Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. ARTICLE: HORIZONTAL DIRECTORS , 114 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1179, 1243, 2020. Lexis, accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 1/3/22)

Since horizontal directors may produce both positive and negative effects, 297a potential amendment to the Clayton Act or to the interpretive regulations must recognize these effects and incorporate provisions that provide flexibility. If policymakers decide that antitrust concerns outweigh the potential benefits horizontal directorships may provide, particularly in the context of directors who serve on competing firms, then the regulatory prohibition needs to be revised to include more stringent restrictions, as well as better mechanics for enforcement.

#### a — Resolved

**OED 89** (Oxford English Dictionary, “Resolved,” Volume 13, p. 725)

Of the mind, etc.: **Freed from doubt or uncertainty**, fixed, settled. Obs.

#### b — Should requires immediacy and certainty

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] 13 "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is *presently* or immediately effective, as opposed to something that *will* or *would* become effective in the future *[in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### c — Substantial

**Words and Phrases 64** (40 W&P 759) (this edition of W&P is out of print; the page number no longer matches up to the current edition and I was unable to find the card in the new edition. However, this card is also available on google books, Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 8, p. 7329)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; **real at present time**, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

#### A new Department of Food would avoid the agency capture problems of the USDA and effectively regulate

Rosenberg & Dutkiewicz 21, Associate Professor of Gender, Sexuality, and Feminist Studies and History at Duke University, (Gabriel, with Jan a visiting fellow in the Animal Law and Policy Program at Harvard University, 12/27/21, Abolish the Department of Agriculture)

The USDA, at this point, is so thoroughly captured by big agribusiness that it barely matters which party picks the secretary; whoever serves will ultimately serve mega-corporations and rich farmers. That’s partly because our political system over-represents rural voters and monied interests. But it’s also the product of more banal dysfunctions: poor institutional design, inertia, and mission-drift at an agency built for a different country and a different time. The USDA was designed for a United States in which a majority of people made their livelihoods, directly or indirectly, from agriculture. That country is long gone. It is replaced by one where very few people—and very few, very large corporations—control food production and distribution to the detriment of American consumers, taxpayers, and workers. If we are to have any hope of fixing what ails the American food system, we need a drastic approach: We need to abolish the USDA. In its place, we need an institution that will prioritize the public interest, including the interests of laborers and eaters, as well as public health and the environment. We need a Department of Food. To understand why the USDA is so ill-suited for the present moment, you have to understand its current structure. With a budget of $146 billion and about 100,000 employees, the USDA is a mammoth agency. It runs three different forms of direct assistance to farmers: commodity support programs, crop insurance, and “conservation” funding, which pays farmers to keep fields fallow or to implement emissions-mitigation programs on their farms. Off the farm, the USDA administers forests through the Forest Service, food safety regulation and oversight through the Food Safety and Inspection Service, rural development initiatives like high-speed broadband through the Rural Utilities Service, agribusiness research and development both directly and through grants, and the promotion and sale of U.S. agricultural commodities in foreign markets. It also administers the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly the Food Stamp Program, now known as “SNAP”) and other nutrition programs, which together make up just under 80 percent of the agency’s budget. All of this is funded through the sprawling Farm Bills that substantively define U.S. agricultural policy and the USDA’s operations every five years. There are two big problems here. On the one hand, the USDA is charged with the oxymoronic double mandate of both promoting and regulating all of American agriculture—two disparate tasks that, when combined, effectively put the fox in charge of the henhouse. On the other hand, the department remains focused on the needs of agricultural producers despite the broad social, environmental, and economic impacts of agriculture. In practice, this means that the USDA’s budget and policies must satisfy large farming interests, who demand and often get something in exchange for agreeing to the USDA’s other policies. These policies also show up in the administration and funding of SNAP, the nation’s biggest—if imperfect—policy solution to food insecurity. Through the Farm Bill, funding for SNAP has been fused to the USDA’s subsidy programs since its creation in the 1960s. As a result, the food security of the nation’s poorest households is continually held ransom to agricultural subsidies; any efforts by progressives to pare those subsidies will be met with cuts or roadblocks to food assistance by farm state politicians. And attempts to improve SNAP similarly run into partisan politics.Meanwhile, all those subsidies flow to farm households that hold a total net wealth nine times greater than the national median and, even among that already wealthy demographic, overwhelmingly to the very wealthiest farmers. Worse still, subsidies can increase the cost of food by incentivizing the production of nonfood commodities such as corn for ethanol and distorting agricultural markets. The marriage of SNAP and commodity support programs isn’t just bad; it’s perverse. There is no reason why food aid to the poorest Americans should be tied to support for the production of cash crops. SNAP is the most flagrant example, but it’s hardly alone. Because the USDA administers important parts of trade, energy, labor, and sometimes even military policy, these all appear in the Farm Bill. That means that farm-state politicians (who write the legislation) and big agricultural interests (whom they serve) use their outsized leverage to shape important policies otherwise unrelated to agriculture. This results in the sorts of massive subsidies and bailouts that prop up mass-scale commodity production. In 2019, for instance, when the Trump administration sought to compensate corn farmers for losses caused by its trade disputes, it overpaid $3 billion in aid to corn farmers, including offering farmers in different regions different prices for corn, with premiums going to those in the South and Midwest. The USDA also regularly provides price supports and bailouts for industries like dairy, with one study suggesting that dairy farms receive upwards of 75 percent of their revenue from different government supports. This horsetrading ultimately distorts and undermines any laudable project progressive forces might try to run through the department. For example, subsidies for corn ethanol ensure the crop is a reliable moneymaker for Midwestern farmers, but its contribution to a sustainable energy policy, its stated raison d’etre, is at best neutral. The throughline of all this dysfunction is simply that the USDA puts the interests of agricultural production for its own sake over everything else. As a result, the countless systemic problems of modern American agriculture go unaddressed. Agricultural workers are among the worst-paid in the United States, their wages completely incommensurate with the difficult and dangerous work they perform. A conservative estimate is that agriculture makes up 10 percent of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. It is also one of the biggest polluters of waterways in the U.S. Small, alternative, and minority-owned farming gets scant support. Meanwhile, over 100 million Americans are obese or suffer from diet-related diseases like diabetes and hypertension, in part as a result of agricultural policies and in part due to the failure of public health policies. Under the USDA’s watch, American farming has become the consummate exception to countless regulatory reforms of the past century. The law forbids you from treating animals in a cruel fashion. . . unless you’re a farmer. The law forbids you from dumping debris into open waterways. . . unless you’re a farmer. The law forbids you from firing an employee for joining a union. . . unless you’re a farmer. And the law also forbids you from employing a child under the age of 14. . . unless you’re a farmer. This last exception was so outrageous that Obama’s Department of Labor attempted to close the loophole in 2012 by extending the protection of existing child labor laws to agriculture. The changes were met with criticism from predictable corners such as major agribusiness interests and farm state politicians, including Democrats Jon Tester and Al Franken. Joining the critics was none other than Tom Vilsack. The changes were scrapped. Upwards of 500,000 children still labor in American agriculture. The USDA was established under Abraham Lincoln in 1862 as part of a suite of policies pushed by the small Northern farmers who made up the base of Lincoln’s Republican Party. In addition to the Homestead Act and the transcontinental railroad, these policies subsidized and accelerated the conversion of Western grasslands into settled agriculture and gave federal backing to the Jeffersonian ideal of small, independent, yeoman farmers—all, of course, on the plundered lands of Indigenous peoples, and doing little for the recently emancipated enslaved people who were excluded from many of the benefits. This basic logic of serving landowners and producers hasn’t changed substantially even as the country and its agriculture have. In the 1860s, Lincoln had good reason to call the USDA “The People’s Department” since 50 percent of the population lived or worked on farms, and in a country of 31 million there were 1.5 million farms. By the 1930s, this idea still held as the population grew to almost 130 million with 6.8 million farms. Today, however, in a country of 330 million, there are only around 2 million farms, and of those the 5 percent largest operations make up almost 60 percent of all production. Farm workers and operators, meanwhile, make up about only 1.7 percent of the U.S. labor force, even as agricultural output is higher than ever. Agriculture is now a high-volume and highly capitalized industry where a tiny fraction of farms produce the vast bulk of commodities. USDA policies are a big reason why. By trying, as MIT Professor Deborah Fitzgerald puts it, to turn “every farm into a factory,” the USDA pushed mechanical implements, artificial fertilizers, pesticides, and debt-financed, capital- and input-intensive agriculture. Given these incentives, most farmers, whether to grow rich or merely survive, have turned to business models predicated on high-yield monocropping, economies of scale, and farm consolidation. That means fewer, substantially larger farms produce just a handful of commodities or factory-farmed animals. Today, corn, soy, and wheat make up half of all crop sales, and upward of 99 percent of meat, including over 9 billion chickens, comes from factory farms where animals are fattened up on those crops. This isn’t a pattern either major political party knows how to break: It’s built into the department’s structure and backed by a powerful lobbying apparatus. Farmers and agribusiness furnish the USDA with political capital and the USDA guarantees stable prices for commodity monocrops with minimal regulation. “Conventional farmers,” writes the agricultural critic Daniel Imhoff, “stay afloat by farming the system rather than growing what might best serve their particular tract of land for the long term or provide for more well-rounded, healthy diets.” The system serves up the safe bet, but it has also selected, generation after generation, for farmers (and policymakers) who only make safe bets. While the USDA’s rotten policies work far better for large farmers than small ones, the primary victims are not people who own farms, but the 99 percent of the population who do not. Now more than ever, workers and consumers desperately need a safe, equitable, and sustainable food system, and to build one we need an agency up to the task. A Department of Food would start with a mandate to maintain a just, healthy, and sustainable food system. Agricultural policy would be only one element, alongside food and nutritional access and industrial, energy, labor, land use, environmental, climate, and animal-welfare policies. It would leave the economic promotion of agriculture to the Department of Commerce and the production of energy to the Department of Energy, shedding its conflicts of interests and focusing its institutional energies exclusively on making sure that all Americans have access to safe, healthy, fairly produced, and affordable food. These goals would be its benchmarks of success—not the economic profitability of American agriculture as it is defined by rich farmers and agribusinesses executives. With a clearer mission, the Department of Food would be leaner and more focused, armed with renewed energy and a broader public interest. It could stop subsidizing the production of corn ethanol. It could, instead, shape agricultural subsidies to incentivize the production of healthy foods that have low greenhouse gas and environmental footprints. It could start taxing the production of foods that do not. The Department of Food could end agriculture’s regulatory exceptionalism by forcing farms to adhere to the same basic environmental, animal welfare, and labor standards that other businesses must already obey. It could ensure that all workers, on farms and in food services, are fairly paid, work under safe conditions, have robust labor rights, and have healthy and affordable food to eat. It could also leave all food-safety policymaking and oversight to the Food and Drug Administration, again eliminating a conflict of interest. (Currently, the USDA receives pressure from special interests, like meatpackers, whose products it promotes. As a result, the department winds up rubber-stamping misleading claims about the humane treatment of animals, for example.) The Department of Food could support major improvements in animal welfare laws, making the sort of treatment that is standard on factory farms illegal and industrialized animal agriculture functionally impossible, and with it the wasteful monocrop corn and soy animal feed supply chain.

#### Regulatory leveraging of conditions on mergers gives them the ability to get massive concessions from companies—The aff forgoes that leverage by prohibiting the mergers

Kovacic & Hyman 16, Professor at the George Mason University School of Law. (William with David Hyman Professor of Health Law & Policy at Georgetown University Law Center, Regulatory Leveraging: Problem or Solution?, <https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/10/13/regulatory-leveraging-problem-or-solution/>)

What if the actor leveraging its power is not a private company, but a government agency? Leveraging enables a regulator to use its gatekeeping authority to secure concessions that it might not have been able to achieve otherwise. Should we applaud or condemn regulators for using a strategy that can result in prosecution when private parties do the same thing? What kind of gatekeeping power makes regulatory leveraging possible? The most obvious example is the authority to grant or withhold approvals over something the regulated entity needs to function, including a license to operate in a given market (e.g., the right to operate a radio station) or the right to introduce a product (e.g., a particular pharmaceutical). A less obvious example is the requirement to obtain regulatory approval before consummating a proposed merger. A regulator that can attach conditions to its approval may use that power to engage in regulatory leveraging. Four Easy Pieces Is regulatory leveraging a normal, legitimate, and perhaps inevitable feature of agency design? Or is it hostage taking that forces regulated entities to pay an often sizeable ransom to be left in peace? We present four brief case studies that give a sense of the circumstances in which regulators can engage in leveraging. Bosch-SPX: Leveraging Across Two Antitrust Domains A regulator can leverage its power across distinct areas within a single policy domain. In 2012, the FTC resolved two matters involving Robert Bosch Gmbh.[2] The first matter involved Bosch’s proposed acquisition of SPX Service Solutions U.S. LLC (“SPX”), which would have given Bosch a “virtual monopoly in the market for air-conditioning recycling, recovery, and recharge devices.” That issue was resolved with Bosch’s agreement to divest its automotive air-conditioner repair equipment business, and make some licensing commitments. The same FTC press release that announced the FTC’s approval of the Bosch-SPX merger also announced that the FTC and Bosch had resolved a separate dispute, over whether SPX had harmed competition by reneging “on a commitment to license key, standard-essential patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.” Bosch agreed to abandon SPX’s claims for injunctive relief in those other cases, thereby resolving an ancillary matter that long preceded the proposed merger. It is not clear from the FTC’s press release how these two entirely distinct issues came to be settled simultaneously – but their appearance in the same press release certainly inclines us to believe that they were resolved as a package deal. Bosch had a huge incentive to give in on the SPX matter in order to obtain speedy approval of the proposed merger—and FTC personnel knew that. Data Protection/Privacy and Merger Approval: Cross-Domain Leveraging by a Multipurpose Regulator In the second scenario, a multipurpose agency leverages power across distinct policy domains within its portfolio of duties. In recent years, the use of data about consumer behavior has become a major policy concern. Some commentators have suggested that merger approval is a useful mechanism to force firms to strengthen their privacy protections. The FTC confronted this issue in two merger reviews involving Google—in 2007, when Google sought regulatory approval for its acquisition of DoubleClick, and in 2010, when the FTC reviewed Google’s purchase of AdMob. The FTC had legal authority to review Google’s proposed acquisitions of DoubleClick and AdMob. It also had authority to investigate Google’s data protection and privacy policies. Agency personnel disagreed on whether the merger review should be used as an excuse/pretext/justification to delve into Google’s data protection and privacy policies. Ultimately, the FTC did not use the merger review process to extract concessions from Google regarding its data protection and privacy policies. Indeed, the FTC’s closing statement in DoubleClick explicitly disavowed such strategies, noting that “the sole purpose of federal antitrust review of mergers and acquisitions is to identify and remedy transactions that harm competition.”[3] Leveraging Across Policy Domains Occupied by Other Regulators In the third scenario, an agency leverages power to affect a policy domain it does not “own.” In 2013, Ally Financial was seeking approval from the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to convert from a bank holding company to a financial holding company. It was also being investigated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), an independent bureau located within the Federal Reserve. Although the CFPB has no regulatory authority over auto dealers, it decided to investigate whether the loan portfolios of indirect auto lenders, such as Ally, indicated that auto dealers were offering less favorable terms to minority borrowers.[4] According to Ally’s former CEO, the CFPB “threatened to derail [Ally’s] efforts to obtain key regulatory approvals if it didn’t agree to settle,” by paying $100 million, and begin offering below-market rates to minorities.[5] He complained that the CFPB “absolutely knew they had tremendous leverage over us,” and was trying to change the policies of an industry it did not have the authority to regulate with a trumped-up case. Internal CFPB memos confirm that agency personnel knew that Ally needed regulatory approval, and the impending deadline to obtain that approval gave Ally a strong incentive to settle its dispute with the CFPB.[6] Leveraging with a “Public Interest” Mandate In a fourth scenario, an agency can use a public interest mandate to achieve commitments that are not authorized by more specific legal commands. Many statutes delegate expansive regulatory authority by requiring an agency to consider the “public interest” in making decisions. For example, in evaluating proposed mergers, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is required to evaluate whether the transaction will serve “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”[7] Public interest standards are an open-ended invitation to engage in regulatory leveraging. The FCC recently used the merger review process to strong-arm Charter Communications to “live up to stringent requirements that don’t apply to its bigger rivals,” including net neutrality standards that the FCC had been (to that date) unable to impose through direct regulation.[8] Over the past decade, the FCC has used this strategy to impose net neutrality constraints on AT&T, Verizon, BellSouth, Comcast, and NBC.[9] In the 1990s, the FCC used regulatory leverage to strong-arm Westinghouse into increasing the number of hours devoted to children’s educational programming on CBS.[10] State and local regulators can play the same game. In 2016, the District of Columbia Public Service Commission conditioned its approval of the Exelon-Pepco merger on a host of ancillary provisions, including a commitment to relocate certain offices to D.C.; the hiring of unionized workers; and at least $1.9 million in annual average charitable contributions to organizations located in D.C. or benefiting D.C. residents.[11] Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Leveraging The most obvious benefit of regulatory leveraging is that it promotes more comprehensive settlements. In Bosch-SPX, the FTC already had an open file on SPX, and Bosch then came to the FTC with the proposed merger. Isn’t it more efficient to adopt one global settlement instead of maintaining two separate proceedings? If there are benefits in settlement (and there are), more comprehensive settlements must be better still. Second, depending on the statutory language that is employed, leveraging may be an authorized delegation of legislative authority to regulate in a flexible way. Stated differently, Congress used “public interest” language to give the agency a hammer that could be deployed when a regulated entity comes to the agency for merger approval. But the agency can only use the hammer in carefully defined circumstances. This structure keeps the agency from expanding its regulatory leverage beyond any given transaction, while giving it the flexibility to solve problems without going through the drudgery of rulemaking or starting a separate case. And, if the agency goes too far, the courts and the legislature stand ready to protect the rule of law. Regulatory leveraging also involves real risks and disadvantages. For starters, regulatory leveraging leads to less disciplined decision-making by governmental agencies. Agencies have an incentive to ignore or downgrade the controls imposed by the substantive regulatory regime and use leverage to circumvent those restrictions. Second, regulatory leveraging leads to less transparent and less accountable decision-making. Merger review rarely ends up in court, so agency leadership need only persuade itself that its “wish list” is worth pursuing. Firms badly want to obtain immediate approval of their mergers, so agencies have them over a barrel.

## Adv — Tech Innovation

#### Food prices don’t cause conflict---reject their bad studies.

Demarest 15—PhD Researcher at the Centre for Research on Peace and Development [Leila, “Food price rises and political instability: Problematizing a complex relationship,” *The European Journal of Development Research*, Vol. 27, No. 5, p. 650-671, Emory Libraries]

6. Conclusions and Way Forward

While some progress has been made in improving our understanding of the linkages between rising food prices and conflict, several important gaps remain. Firstly, notions of conflict and political instability are often used interchangeably, while these concepts and the relationships between them remain to some extent vague. The ‘food riot’ concept in particular leads to confusion. Although it is popularly seen as a violent rise of the masses, in reality, many peaceful events are gathered under this term, while violence is often committed by the state rather than by hungry consumers. The term also presupposes that food is the central issue at hand, which does not necessarily have to be the case. Many misunderstanding arise from the second gap identified in this paper: the uncritical data gathering based on international news reports. Not only are these remarkably inconsistent, they also make use of classifications which are not scientifically investigated. Finally, causal mechanisms in the relationship between rising food prices and conflict often remain assumptions in the literature and lack empirical foundation. Three crosscutting avenues for improvement therefore exist: better concept definitions, better data gathering, and more focus on contexts.

Clearly defined concepts and categorizations of conflict and instability are a necessary foundation for research on the linkages between rising food prices and conflict. For (food) protests in particular, purposeful categorizations require an enhanced insight in the events that took place on the ground. Local news sources for data gathering can prove to be more reliable than Western (English) media to accomplish this. Event descriptions are also likely to be more detailed in local sources, which allows for a first-hand qualitative analysis of causes and context.

As international food prices are likely to remain high, improving our understanding of the causal mechanisms which can lead to conflict remains crucial. We can draw important lessons from the literature on poverty and conflict, resource scarcity and conflict, and regime transition in Africa. The causal role of economic factors alone has continuously been questioned, and ‘context’ or prevailing political, economic, and social factors play a crucial role in the conflict outcome. The argument that adverse economic shocks seem more of a trigger to conflict rather than an important cause is not particularly remarkable in itself. Yet while many authors acknowledge this, the focus often remains on the trigger. Resource scarcity, climate change, population growth, or food insecurity often remain the starting point of analyses, with researchers consequently tracing the divergent (theoretical) possibilities for conflict. In the end, most admit that these factors do not automatically lead to conflict everywhere, and stress the importance of context. Because the theoretical possibilities for conflict are so large, however, the context factor remains rather understudied with as most agreed upon notions that elements of ‘grievance’ and ‘collective action’ are required.

It is hence important to focus more on the ‘contexts’ that can lead to conflict and, in doing so, to make the distinction between different forms of conflict. This also implies a data collection exercise. Contextual data are currently collected at the aggregate, national level, and only on a yearly basis, which can lead to spurious relations. While the use of these variables is increasingly questioned in civil war studies, we can also doubt their strength in the study of highly localized, one-time events such as riots. I particularly make the case for ‘bringing politics back in’. The policies taken by the government are crucial in the violent escalation of social conflict (e.g. accommodation versus repression), but the only variable currently in use to explain state behaviour seems to be the country-level regime type variable (Polity IV or Freedom House), which is also used with regards to highly localized conflicts. Other ways in which politics matter, can be the strength of the political opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, was probably better organized than other opposition groups to make use of economic unrest.

#### Food shortages won’t cause war

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(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

## Adv — Bargaining Power

# 1NR

## K — Discursive Violence

#### Their Framework argument is a link—Investment in short term plans to “solve” a specific problem reify structural violence—The K is a prior question

Stein 16 Stein, Sharon, University of British Columbia Rethinking the Ethics of Internationalization: Five Challenges for Higher Education. InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies, 12(2) https://moam.info/rethinking-the-ethics-of-internationalization-five-\_5bb045a7097c47c5798b469e.html

Many humanist efforts are specifically humanitarian in nature, in which individual students seek to ‘give back’ in recognition of their relative advantage in existing systems. In the context of internationalization, this framing may be preferable to market-driven approaches, yet its construction of relationality maintains the student in a position of benevolence and enlightenment vis-à-vis those they are understood to be ‘helping’ (Jefferess, 2008). In this ethical formation, students from the Global North are generally situated as those with superior knowledge, values, and experiences that they generously grant to the ‘less fortunate.’ Within this paternalistic dynamic, the student is rarely prompted to question the underlying systems or causes of inequality or to consider how they benefit from and perpetuate these systems. Rather, the Other becomes a vehicle for affirming their exceptionalism and moral ‘goodness’ – potentially as a means to justify their own privilege. Gaztambide-Fernández and Howard (2013) point out that this investment in “Being good and having moral standing is a social outcome that is premised on the unequally distributed ability to do certain things, to enact certain roles, and to mobilize particular discourses” (p. 2). This framing then forecloses the opportunity for students to examine their own complicity, and may be understood as an example of what Tuck and Yang (2012), drawing on Malwhinney, describe as “moves to innocence,” through which an individual seeks to assuage their guilt, deny responsibility, preserve a positive self-image, and maintain their existing investments in harmful desired futures. Thus, despite their important differences, both market-driven and humanist approaches to internationalization are often premised on developmental notions of humanity, and are shaped by a “convenient amnesia” of colonial histories and current structures of harm (Thobani as cited by Stone-Mediatore, 2011, p. 49). Questions that therefore arise include: Why does encountering difference in the context of internationalization often reproduce rather than disrupt assumptions about the supremacy of Western knowledge and society? How might humanitarian efforts abroad function as a means to avoid addressing local injustices? How do developmental logics limit the possibility of engaging in relationships premised on solidarity and self-implication rather than instrumentalization for affirmation of a benevolent self? What might prompt students to see their own material comforts as part of the cause of inequity? What might interrupt our satisfactions with existing formulations of self/subject and other/object, and is it possible to imagine an approach to ethics that begins and ends with neither? Conclusion: Im/possible Ethical Demands There is a danger that our critical approaches to the ethics of internationalization may be circularly repeating the very violence that we seek to disrupt. In order to make visible the ways that colonial categories and capitalist imperatives are reproduced, scholars of higher education need to historicize the deep entanglements of our institutions and our subjectivities with empire, trace the origins of our dearest concepts, face our own investments in the false promises of universal humanity and linear progress, and consider how all of these frame and thereby limit available ethical and educational possibilities. As Unterhalter and Carpentier (2010) note, “Global higher education seems uniquely well placed to serve the interests of redressing inequality, enhancing participatory debate and deliberation. But to do this requires higher education institutions recognizing problems of their past and present in order to contribute to ideas of justice for our future” (p. 29). Decolonial analysis, as I have offered in this paper, is just one means of doing this work. However, analysis itself is insufficient. Having identified the depth of the problems we face, it is common to promptly begin the search for concepts and plans of action that can renew our hope and that we believe will lead to something better. This desire for guaranteed alternatives may be in part related to the fact that conversations about internationalization tend to be, as Waters (2012) suggests, “dominated and driven by educational practitioners – education institutions, state level policy makers and public bodies, as well as private, commercial enterprises – with a vested interest in the ultimate success of internationalising initiatives” (p. 127). The imperative toward immediate improvement and assured success is also a deeply embedded dimension of Western thought, which constantly seeks to reduce complexity and eliminate uncertainty in order to smoothly engineer the future. And there is good reason for seeking solutions; harmful practices and policies do not stop producing harm when we name them. Every critique therefore begs the follow-up questions: “So what? Now what?” (Andreotti, 2011, p. 227). These questions are important, and answering them is one essential element of our responsibility as researchers and educators to contribute to the reduction of ongoing harm. There is a strong need to produce practical, accessible, and impactful resources for use in higher education classrooms, policy reforms, training for administrators, and social justice programming for students and staff. At the same time, these solutions often create their own unforeseen problems. Furthermore, desires for coherence, consensus, and guaranteed futures have all contributed to the reproduction of significant harms as certain experiences, individuals, and even entire communities are sacrificed or silenced in order to achieve these goals. Although we cannot live and act in a space of uncertainty and ambivalence at all times, the immediate search for practical action and answers can also foreclose difficult but necessary conversations and questions that have no easy resolution. We also need to learn to sit in this space of uncertainty and discomfort to consider questions with either no answer, or too many answers to count; to lay out on the table the contradictory elements of all possible answers to our ‘so what, now what’ questions; and to ask self-implicated questions about our own deep investments in a harmful system.

#### They dropped that their framing of developing countries in their other tags are just as violent — this isn’t just an argument about a single instance of terminology in the 1AC but a repeating framing of the US being a developed country where we can solve sustainable farming, but the rest of the non-European world is “developing and inferior” and in need of US saving

Brown et al 20, (Kara, Associate Professor of Education University of South Carolina, with Payal Shah associate professor of Educational Studies at the University of South Carolina, and E. Doyle Stervick associate professor of Educational Leadership and Policies at the University of South Carolina, Labeling the World: The 3P Framework for Critiquing and Reconstructing Our Categorization Processes, Current Issues in Comparative Education (CICE) Volume 22, Issue 1, Special Issue 2020, KU Libraries)

Aside from geographical descriptors, other labels often applied to the region also allude to the core-periphery relationship described in World Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 1974). Some of these labels include “developing/developed”, “postcolonial”, the “global South”, and “Third World”. These labels have distinct epistemological origins as well as political implications, and have been applied, appropriated, and contested by scholars, practitioners, and activists on the ground - they illustrate the plurality around how labels are appropriated, negotiated, and contested. Below we explore how the frame of postcolonialism, and many of these other labels, apply to the South Asian region. Postcolonialism in South Asia Postcolonialism grew out of the fields of history, literature and cultural studies and provides critical analysis of European imperial power (Said, 1978; Fanon, 1961; Gandhi, 1998; Chakrabarty, 2000; Bhabba, 1994). In Orientalism, Said (1978) introduced an interpretation where the world was divided into the “orient” and the “occident”, with Western Europe as the “occident” and the rest of the world as the “orient”. This framing is often considered the genesis of the cultural concepts of the ‘West” and the “East”, mutually constitutive constructs where the West represents the Oriental world pejoratively as inferior, backwards, irrational, and exotic, juxtaposed against the rational, progressive, and modern West. The imposition of an East/West binary has led to the development of a subjugated colonial identity based on the dehumanization of colonized people of the East that continues on into the present day (Said, 1978; Fanon, 1961). Postcolonial scholars also point out that this dichotomous classification of West/East, third world/first world, developed/developing, etc. serves to homogenize and suppress people from different regions across the “East”, i.e. the Middle East, Africa, Indian Subcontinent, from being able to represent themselves as distinct cultures. This homogenization, or essentialization, enables the “West” to maintain power and control over the homogenous “Other” (Said, 1978). As explained further below, this dichotomous domination continues to frame present day efforts of development, or assistance to countries with poverty – most of whom are peripheral nations and former colonies (World Bank, 2020). We can see how this dichotomous classification provides necessary perspective into how power has been maintained and deployed.

#### This ev is awful—it is just saying visual images of danger don’t always lead to good responses but concedes that reps have consequences

Shim 14 (David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen – As part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. Routledge Book Publication –Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing – p.24-25)

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them. Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other. However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

#### The terms we use to label countries have uniquely important consequences

Brown et al 20, (Kara, Associate Professor of Education University of South Carolina, with Payal Shah associate professor of Educational Studies at the University of South Carolina, and E. Doyle Stervick associate professor of Educational Leadership and Policies at the University of South Carolina, Labeling the World: The 3P Framework for Critiquing and Reconstructing Our Categorization Processes, Current Issues in Comparative Education (CICE) Volume 22, Issue 1, Special Issue 2020, KU Libraries)

Labeling is not a neutral, descriptive process, but a choice about how to read the world. Berger and Luckmann (1966/1981) noted that (as cited in Lagerspetz, p. 52, 2003), “applying divisions and categorizations is a way of defining reality, of constructing ‘knowledge’.” These terms are used both by researchers and in society generally, often in different but interconnected ways, and are bound up with ongoing struggles over meaning and identity, as Platt (2009) demonstrated in his discussion of the label “post post-Soviet.” The phrase manages to allude to two temporal shifts, a political transformation, and a geographic region. Labelling reflects broader cultural responses to both anticipated and experienced changes in society: “the common apprehension of a new epoch means simply that the typical post-Soviet discursive mechanisms…have lost their dominance in the social construction of historical process and social identity, yielding their place to other visions of present situatedness” (p. 6). Labeling is therefore a window into ongoing conceptual and epistemological conversations about the world and how it understands itself; the categories function as powerful units of analysis that invite scholars into broader theoretical conversations.